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THESIS

PROTEST MOVEMENTS AND THE SECURITY POLICY OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SINCE 1950

by

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December 1983

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T209056

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Protest Movements and the Security Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany Since 1950		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis; December 1983
7. AUTHOR(s) Arthur Neil Black		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) AFIT Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433		12. REPORT DATE December 1983
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 135
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		16. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) National Security West Germany Anti-nuclear Movements		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This thesis presents an analysis of selected West German protest movements from the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 to the present. The purpose is to test the hypothesis that public opposition to security policies of the Federal Republic of Germany, as a continuing process, has enjoyed an increasing amount of success in affecting national decision-making, and may play a key role in shaping West Germany's future in the NATO alliance. Social problems related to the effects of radical		

20. (Continued)

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Protest Movements and the Security Policy of the
Federal Republic of Germany Since 1950

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1983

ABSTRACT

This thesis presents an analysis of selected West German protest movements from the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 to the present. The purpose is to test the hypothesis that public opposition to security policies of the Federal Republic of Germany, as a continuing process, has enjoyed an increasing amount of success in affecting national decision-making, and may play a key role in shaping West Germany's future in the NATO alliance. Social problems related to the effects of radical counter-cultures are discussed, as well as speculation about Soviet involvement in West German protest movements. The recent success of the Greens/Alternative Party in several local elections in West Germany raises the possibility that public attitudes may become less hospitable to the U.S. military presence in West Germany. This trend could have serious implications for NATO and for U.S. interests in Western Europe as a whole.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Professor David Yost for his invaluable assistance in guiding this thesis to its logical conclusion. I also wish to thank Dr. Friedhelm Meyer zu Natrup of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Dr. Dietrich Goldschmidt of the Max-Planck Institut für Bildungsforschung, Major General (ret) Gert Bastian, Uwe Nerlich of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Professor Steve Garrett, and those members of the West German peace movement, all of whom provided useful information in order to make this thesis objective as possible. I alone am responsible for the views and conclusions expressed in this thesis, however.

I. INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE STAGE

The Federal Republic of Germany is a most important country in both political and economic terms. The maintenance of good relations between the United States and the Federal Republic is, therefore, vital in safeguarding our own interests, as well as those of other allies.

Since the end of World War II, the Federal Republic has experienced three separate periods of opposition to its government's defense and foreign policies. This study examines the three phases, first from an historical perspective and second, with a view towards elucidating the political implications that concern each phase.

A. POSTWAR DEMILITARIZATION OF THE WESTERN SECTORS OF GERMANY

On January 2, 1950, Pastor Martin Niemöller, the German Protestant leader, was cited in a New York Times article as having "projected himself on the public scene with recent statements of nationalist feelings."¹ In advocating the risk of Communist rule to achieve Germany's reunification, he stated, "the Germans would rather take the risk of living under a Communist dictatorship in a unified country than continue as at present with two governments."² He implied that the Germans have the right to formulate their own

country's destiny and to demand that their country be unified. Niemöller viewed the reunification of Germany as the condition for maintaining an enduring peace and linked it to the issue of religious freedom.

The present peace movement in West Germany has roots extending back to the first few years of postwar Germany. During that period, the fate of Germany centered around two questions:

- 1) What were the original desires of the German people following the war?

- 2) What events renewed the issues of rearmament and reunification?

After the Nazi government signed its unconditional surrender in May 1943, the bulk of the German people were left exhausted, disillusioned and in a general state of shock. Internally, their country was in turmoil, with its governmental institutions collapsed and its cities and economy ravaged by the war. Externally, the Allied powers prepared to systematically rebuild the country.

The Western occupying powers, the United States, France, and Great Britain, all had divergent interests in relation to the future of Germany, especially in defining the shape and character of the political and governmental system which each wanted to see introduced.³ This posed severe problems. The Americans placed a great deal of emphasis on the merits

of a self-government system, and realized that the "only way to re-educate the Germans [in that system] was to give them the chance to govern themselves again."⁴ The British and later the French were more concerned about the economics of shouldering responsibility for German internal affairs. They too ultimately accepted the proposition of allowing the Germans to rebuild their own economy and manage their own affairs, as a way for France and Great Britain to escape that burden. Other problems entered the scene when the Western powers perceived that the armament of West Germany was necessary in order to thwart Soviet expansionism. More important were the problems that related to German society itself.

The reconstruction of German institutions was heavily influenced by the social and economic trends following the end of the war. For example, in 1946 the country's industrial output fell to approximately 33 percent of its level in 1936. At the same time, the population drastically increased due to the flow of refugees into Western Germany from the Eastern sectors of the old Reich.⁵ Although no social revolution occurred in Germany, the postwar society was sharply distinguished from what it had been after World War I. The most noticeable characteristic of change was the "rate at which urbanization and industrial development had gone ahead."⁶ For example, the agricultural sector had

steadily declined. In 1939, it amounted to 17 percent of the population. By 1960, it had dropped to 11 percent (in the Federal Republic of Germany). The industrial sector had risen proportionately. Other segments of German society also underwent changes.

The aftermath of the war had a sharp impact on the position of the traditional elites. The aristocracy, which had been prominent throughout the administration and the armed forces, was shattered. Some changes occurred in the ownership of industry, and new men were found to replace those who had been associated with the Nazis. Family and social connections, as well as favorable educational opportunities, became less significant in light of new self-made men who rose in areas of politics, administration, industry, banking and professional services. In sum, these are the roots of today's pluralistic, pragmatic and stable West German society.⁷

Some observers of the postwar German period referred to it as "point zero", implying that German history reached a break in its continuity and that 1945 constituted a new starting point, a new beginning.⁸ Although this attitude was restricted to a small minority of anti-Nazi leaders, it seems natural that the direction of German affairs rested in their hands, while the greater percentage of the society turned its attention to the struggle for food and shelter.⁹

As was stated earlier, the Western occupation forces had differing opinions regarding the direction of the future German state, but they in essence all agreed with the attitude of a new beginning. The reconstruction was, therefore, carefully centered around that concept. It began systematically with the licensing of newspapers and political parties, which were monopolized by the previously mentioned minority of new democratic leaders.

These leaders were members of an older generation, most of them in their fifties and sixties, who had played important roles in the democratic parties of the Weimar Republic. They belonged to such organizations as the Catholic Center Party, left-wing liberals or right-wing liberals, or the German Nationalists (DNVP) or the Social Democrats (SPD). The groups to the right of the SPD formed the Christian Democrats (CDU), a party consisting of old Catholic parties, Protestant conservatives in the North and political Protestantism (CSVD) in the Southwest. Other liberals formed their own parties, the FDP, DVP, and the LDP. These latter liberal parties had leaders that had not occupied key positions in the Weimar Republic, because of their youth. There would have been many more candidates for leadership positions, had Hitler not had many of them killed after the attempt on his life in July 1944.¹⁰

With the new start for Germany came a surge of religious revival. The social plight that befell the German people after the war acted as a catalyst for this revival, a strong force which acted upon the German political process by the way of a large Christian party that encompassed both Catholics and Protestants, individual dignity, and hope for a European Union. This religious factor is not to be taken lightly, for its notion of practical Christianity is the foundation of Christian Socialism.¹¹ This religious fervor was used by the CDU and the CSU as a rallying point that was often echoed in their topics for speeches such as "the duty of a Christian in politics, politics conducted from faith, or the obligations of Christian moral law."¹² Other political camps such as the liberals and the SPD were also affected. This new wave of Christian conservatism sprang from deep-rooted sentiments of the German people, possibly a result of the preceding Nazi period when human integrity was all but stamped out.

In postwar Germany, it was easy to correlate the religious revival and the desire for democracy and federalism; they were interwoven. Catholics, along with Protestants, considered such principles as part of the same mission. A founder of the CDU wrote:

Any serious Christian will have to understand the deepest roots of the German and Central European catastrophe in this fateful process of intellectuality going astray...the secularization of the public and

thereby of political life which replaced God with public idols and finally banned all morality, all social ethics from its thinking in order to replace it with a relativizing reason¹³ and, consequently, the adoration of materialism.

The attempt of Bismarck to establish a powerful German nation-state (and all it implied) was rejected by the new conservative leaders (CDU/CSU). It was thought that individual and group interests would be limited by the demands of the common good, "a harmonious solidarity between classical liberalism and Marxian socialism."¹⁴ The idea of a harmonious solidarity was not only limited to the confines of the German Republic. The fall of the Third Reich and national pride and glory prompted a rising belief in European unity, a Federal Union with a decentralized Germany as part of a larger confederation of European states. The reunification of East and West Germany was thought to be facilitated by the idea of a loose federation of autonomous states.¹⁵ The realization of those goals, however, was not what followed.

B. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Between the years 1946 and 1948, the United States changed its attitude towards Germany for two reasons: first, the switch from the overriding fear of resurgence of German Nazism to a fear of Soviet aggression in Europe, and second, the impossibility of maintaining indefinitely the American Zone and the American Sector of Berlin as separate, dependent, occupied territories.¹⁶

In light of the new U.S. core of interests that was centered around the perceived Soviet threat, the U.S. proposition for a unification of the three Western Zones into a federal state seemed appropriate. In March 1948, the British and the French, together with the United States, agreed to the joining of their respective occupational zones and called for a Constitutional Assembly to draft a federal constitution for the new German state. This event, coupled with the problems that concerned a breakdown of Four Power cooperation in Berlin, played a major part in the creation of the Federal Republic. The Berlin blockade that began in June 1948 only quickened the process. In August 1948, the German officials rejected the idea of a Constitutional Assembly, because they felt that the word constitution implied a sense of permanence for the new political community. Instead, they drafted the Basic Law for all of Germany and on May 23, 1949, it went into effect.¹⁷ What followed that decree was a set of events that confirmed the disintegration of cooperative Four Power control over Germany.

From the period of 1948 to 1949, the German leadership groups of the CDU/CSU and the SPD all agreed that:

- 1) The territory of Germany extended to the Reich borders of December 31, 1937.
- 2) The German Volk was indivisible by its very nature. Adenauer and the CDU held that the creation of the Federal

Republic of Germany was the first and necessary step to this goal. Adenauer stated:

We approached our work in the firm and unshakeable intention to obtain the unity of all Germany in this way, a unity which is and shall remain our goal.¹⁸

It should be noted that the SPD went along with the creation of the West German state, but it emphasized the temporary nature of that state and desired to play down the permanent character of the new political community.

The character of the German nation at that time is best described as a sense of national consciousness where the Germans perceived themselves as a group distinct from all others. The grounds for this perception were based on the following points:

- 1) the perception of a common experience of occupation;
- 2) the lack of contrary evidence;
- 3) the presumably temporary nature of the political separation;
- 4) the foreign sources of the temporary situation;
- 5) the ratification of the Four Power control over all of Germany after the end of the Berlin blockade;
- 6) the open border in Berlin;
- 7) the rather porous border between West Germany and East Germany.¹⁹

Nationalism, as a doctrine, was understandably de-emphasized due to its links with the Third Reich. The

West German call for national self-determination, however, as an inalienable right, seemed to justify the "one-Germany" claim of the Federal Republic.

In accordance with their feelings for self-determination, the West Germans viewed the question of reunification as vital to national survival.²⁰ However, the German leadership broke into two separate groups, because of differing views concerning the wisdom of forming a West German state. The first group consisted of the CDU/CSU led by Konrad Adenauer. They claimed that the creation of the Federal Republic was the first step towards reunification. They assumed that a strong and politically stable West German state, allied with other Western powers, would eventually draw East Germany to the West and in the long run prevent East Germany's political consolidation.²¹

The second political group, the SPD, viewed the attempt to create a new state as a stepping-stone to reunification as wrong, because they feared that the Soviets would be forced to do likewise in the East. Naturally, that would lessen the chance for any negotiated settlement on the whole issue. The SPD's plan was to create a neutral, unarmed Germany as the key to any lasting peace. Both parties did agree, however, that peace would depend upon a reunified Germany. The SPD also had another reason for desiring reunification. Politically speaking, its chief support

prior to the Hitler regime had come from the urban areas of central and East Germany.²²

The CDU/CSU's perception of the Soviet threat was different than the SPD's. This point is critical in understanding the Federal Republic's present policy of Ostpolitik. The SPD feared a Soviet attack, but much less than the consequences or dangers of an over-aggressive Western policy. Any rearmament at all, they feared, would dash any hope of reunification with East Germany. Although the SPD was not a Marxist-Leninist party, it didn't rule out the possibility of becoming a partner with the Soviet Union, should the notion of a neutral Germany within an all-European security system become feasible.²³

In 1949, a popularity poll was taken which indicated some interesting factors. Thirty-one percent of those polled approved of the CDU and twenty-seven percent approved of Konrad Adenauer. The first federal election in 1949, however, showed an unimpressive victory for the CDU/CSU, an indication that the German people were unsure of Adenauer's Westpolitik (see Table 1.1). The CDU/CSU polled thirty-one percent of the popular vote as compared to twenty-nine percent for the SPD and twelve percent for the FDP. After an ingenious move to form a coalition with the FDP and the German Party (DP), Adenauer was left with a coalition numbering 208 seats. It might be noted that even with the

TABLE 1.1
WEST GERMAN ELECTION RESULTS

<u>LAND</u>	<u>NO. OF SEATS</u>	<u>CDU/CSU</u>	SPD	<u>FDP</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Baden- Wurtttemberg	55	26	15	10	4
Bavaria	78	24	18	17	29
Bremen	5	1	3	--	1
Hamburg	13	3	6	2	2
Hesse	36	9	13	12	2
Lower Saxony	58	12	24	5	17
North Rhine Westphalia	109	43	37	10	19
Rhineland Palatinate	25	13	7	4	1
Saarland	--	--	--	--	--
Schleswig Holstein	23	8	8	2	5
West Berlin	19	5	9	5	--
Total	402	139	131	52	80

SOURCE: John C. Lane and James K. Pollock, Source Materials on the Government and Politics of Germany (Michigan: Wahrs Publishers, 1964), p. 58.

added seats, his election to the chancellery was won by one vote, his own.²⁴

The outcome of the election was close for several reasons. The most important reason, other than the large number of SPD supporters, had to do with the questions of rearmament and reunification. Allied powers such as Great Britain and France were determined in their attempts to keep Germany from ever again posing as a threat to Western Europe (under the Allied military government, the German armed forces were dissolved). The German people were led to believe that military behavior and habits of thought were evil, and that no rearmament would be possible for an indefinite period of time (in fact there was no army for ten years).²⁵ Even the Western Allies reduced their own occupational forces, until the Berlin blockade and the Korean War led to a radical change in their attitudes towards the Soviet Union. Another factor that had an equally disconcerting effect on Western Europe's own confidence in United States' protection was the successful Soviet testing of atomic weapons in 1949.

In an interview with The Times (London), Adenauer expressed opposition to the rearmament policy, but added that if the Allies demanded that the Federal Republic participate in European defense, it would do so only as a

German contingent within a European force.²⁶ Adenauer actually viewed rearmament in terms of three priorities:

- 1) no army at all;
- 2) a role in a European Defense Community;
- 3) rearmament within the framework of NATO.²⁷

One can readily see that the German people were originally told that rearmament and a return to military habits of thought were not the way of the future for the Federal Republic. Although the attitudes of the Allies changed, the people of West Germany held on to their views and demonstrated them in the 1949 election.

The anti-militarist and anti-military propaganda of the Allies had a great effect upon the German people, especially after twelve years of totalitarian rule and six years of total war--not to mention the effects of World War I. There was resentment about the quick change in the attitude of the Allies towards the German military power and skills and many Germans felt that these "despised" German qualities were being exploited.²⁸ The mood of the German people still reflected a strong sentiment for peace and neutrality, which was discussed earlier. The opposition to rearmament was particularly strong among the German youth. In Germany they became known as the ohne mich, meaning "without me".²⁹ In December 1950, for example, students at Bonn University voted 335 to 150 against rearmament of any kind, and more

than seventy percent of the students said that they would never put on a uniform.³⁰ It was from these roots that the West German peace movement grew.

C. BACKGROUND ON PACIFISM AND PROTEST

Two factors combine to make the neutralist and pacifist movement significant; they are geography and history. Since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949, Germany had been the locus of East-West division and tension in Europe. When the original principles for the new German state were first conceived, the German people desired the lofty notion of a federal republic with their own brand of national self-determination and Christian ethic. What evolved from those hopes and desires is today's Germany, divided into two separate states, each having a large concentration of weapons and foreign troops.

The failure to realize the original hopes and desires of the German people is now a matter of history. What is relevant, however, are the options that are left open to them. The peace movement has always offered an alternative to the present situation in Germany. It proposed a policy of disarmament in 1950 and a return to German nationalism and self-determination, not in a militarist sense, but with a view towards the Federal Republic's legitimate aspirations to German national unity. In 1957-1958 it proposed a ban on nuclear weapons and the setting-up of nuclear-free zones in

Europe. The campaign against nuclear power plants in 1977 was an attempt to bring about alternatives to save the environment. The recent protest over the enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) and the 1979 NATO decision to station Cruise and Pershing II missiles on West European soil is part of the peace movement's continuing effort to provide these alternatives. There is one sentiment among the German people that escapes all criticism; that is the fear of another war on their own soil with all the misery and despair that would be part of it.

II. THREE PHASES OF OPPOSITION

West German opposition to security policy has occurred during three separate phases in the postwar history of the Federal Republic. An examination of these phases, in a strictly historical sense, is necessary in order to point out the issues that were at stake as well as the nature of the opposition that met those issues.

A. THE MOVEMENT AGAINST REARMAMENT (1950-1955)

On November 22, 1949 the Western Allies concluded the Petersberg Protocol as a result of their attempts to enforce the Potsdam Agreement.¹ The hope, however, on the part of the Allies to re-educate the Germans toward demilitarization dimmed in light of the growing number of conflicts between the West and the Soviet Union, and from 1947 onwards the United States considered the possibility of recruiting German military manpower.² At a meeting in London, from May 11 to 13, 1950, the Foreign Ministers representing the three Western allied nations agreed that "the Federal Republic must begin to take an active part in the Atlantic Alliance."³ When the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950 the planners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were faced with a new situation. They became concerned over the possibility of an armed Soviet attack that would drive the

Western Allies back to the Atlantic coast in a matter of a few days.⁴ The German perception of the effects of the Korean War is best presented by Adenauer, who stated in his memoirs that:

The German situation was not unlike that of Korea. Germany too was divided into two parts: one half was under communist dictatorship and the other characterized by free and democratic institutions. Strong Soviet forces were stationed [in the East]; In the German West there were only the relatively weak forces of the occupying powers--from a military point of view, we Germans are quite defenseless.⁵

What resulted from this concern over the Soviet threat was the New York Conference on September 19, 1950, where the Western Allies announced that they would consider any attack against the Federal Republic or against Berlin as an attack upon themselves and that they (Western Allies) would strengthen their military forces in Germany.⁶ At the same time, a special security police force of 30,000 men was authorized to combat the growing threat of a much larger Soviet-sponsored East German para-military force known as Bereitschaften or "Alert Forces" that was formed in early 1948. By April 1949, these East German troops were estimated to number more than 50,000, in addition to the regular police formations.⁷ For unknown reasons, the reaction by the Western Allies to this East German military build-up was not revealed until May 23, 1950. On that day the U.S. Ambassador at Moscow handed the Soviet Foreign Minister a Note that expressed the U.S. Government's concern

over this matter and reiterated the accepted principle of complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. The Note went on to state:

...The Soviet Government is simultaneously creating a military force of considerable size and strength in Germany in violation of its solemn international commitments. By this and other like actions the Soviet Government has destroyed world confidence in the sincerity of its promises and has created throughout the world widespread doubt as to its specific intentions. If the Soviet Government wishes to restore in some measure international confidence...it cannot fail to dissolve immediately the militarized units which it has set up in Eastern Germany.⁸

The Soviet reply of October 19, 1950, merely stated that the original Control Council arrangements provided for the formation of an armed police force and added that the decision of the New York Conference revealed the intention of the West to train a real army in the Federal Republic.⁹

The exchange of accusations between the Soviets and the Western Allies continued throughout October 1950. As the Plevin Plan, which called for the formation of an integrated European Defense Community (EDC) or European Army, was being considered, the response from German opposition groups to rearmament grew in strength. The West German opposition in the early 1950s mainly consisted of pacifist-minded nationalists, certain religious organizations, the SPD under leadership of Kurt Schumacher, and the West German Trade Union (DGB).¹⁰

The strongest opposition to rearmament came from Schumacher, who argued that the Federal Republic's participation in the Western alliance would destroy any hope of reunification forever. He asserted that:

The Soviet Union might yet agree to some sort of arrangement that would allow East Germany to rejoin West Germany, and that therefore everything should be done to induce the Russians to explore such a possibility, and absolutely nothing to discourage them.

Moreover, Schumacher stated that the New Europe, referring to the EDC and the Schuman Plan, would be dominated by four Ks--KAPITALISMUS, KLERIKALISMUS, KONSERVATISMUS, AND KARTELS.¹² Schumacher's opposition to rearmament was a reflection of his assessment of the postwar situation, which can be characterized by two basic factors. First, he believed that the Western capitalists would attempt to exploit the resources, both physical and human, that existed in postwar Germany. Second, Schumacher was concerned with the opinion of Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain. According to him, the future of Germany was ultimately in the hands of the German masses.¹³ Mass public opinion is discussed in the following chapter.

Schumacher's arguments against rearmament, referring to the proposition by Adenauer and the Western powers, included the following:

- 1) An objection to the establishment of military forces under the control of the old military elite;

2) A rejection of the proposed inclusion of German contingents in a European army under NATO command. (He viewed this as a denial of equality to the Germans.)¹⁴ What should be noted about Schumacher's opposition to rearmament is the fact that he did not reject the idea of rearmament entirely. He maintained that if the situation arose where the German people would have to make sacrifices, they had to be given the guarantee that they would be fighting for their own security and not for the interests of other countries.¹⁵

Another form of opposition to rearmament was generated by the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches in Germany. The most vocal of these religious pacifist groups was the Evangelical Church (EKD) under the leadership of Pastor Martin Niemöller, the Church president in Hesse. From a historical perspective, the EKD argument to this day has consistently been based upon the hope that Germany would one day be reunified.¹⁶ In 1950, the EKD Synod in Berlin Weissensee stated:

Countless anxious people all over the world cry today for peace...Hardly has the last war ended when arms are being produced for the next. Our own people [is] at the mercy of powers confronting one another and filled with distrust. The Iron Curtain dismembers our nation and major conflicts could break out here any moment. Yet no one knows what will become of humanity if modern weapons of destruction are used in a war which then no one can control.¹⁷

Dr. Niemöller's position on rearmament was similar to Schumacher's in that his arguments were designed to show that "Germans must rely on themselves for their spiritual and political salvation rather than on the occupying powers who are in Germany for their own purposes rather than for Germany's good."¹⁸ Dr. Niemöller's approach to the rearmament issue, towards the end of 1950, became more political than spiritual. In an address to his old church in Berlin, he summed up his arguments by stating:

Only the West Germans could be the neighbors of the Germans in the East. It was a matter of indifference to the Russians, the Poles, and the Czechs whether millions of Germans in the East lived or not. France would even be very glad if these Germans were dead, for the French could then sleep the sounder. In the final analysis the British and Americans had no neighbors but themselves.¹⁹

The West Berliners, however, were provoked into demonstrations over Niemöller's sentiments, considering their own feelings that all of Berlin would have been part of the East German state, had it not been the strong hand of the Western Allies. Because of these and other similar statements on Niemöller's part, a conference of the leaders of the Evangelical Church was called to consider the proper response to Niemöller's position. The outcome of that conference was a compromise in that the Church called on its own members to observe their duty in public life, but requested all Church officials "for their duty to the Gospel" to exercise restraint in their political involvement.²⁰

Niemöller, however, continued to voice his opposition to rearmament on political grounds. In a speech delivered before the Land Synod on November 28, 1950, Niemöller stated that he would risk everything to prevent the attempt to force arms into West German hands. In a heated exchange of views, he accused the Evangelical Church of copying the Roman Catholic Church and stated, "Martin Luther would be ashamed to have his name on your lips."²¹ In this same speech, Niemöller repeated his allegation that the Federal Republic was "conceived in Rome and born in Washington." The Press service of the CDU issued a burning response to Niemöller's statements by calling them "monstrous" and describing him as being "an impossible person in public life."²²

On March 10, 1952, the Soviet Foreign Ministry passed an unexpected Note to the American Embassy that consisted of a draft for a German Peace Treaty.²³ The Note in essence urged the Western powers to sign a peace treaty with Germany as soon as possible and implied, in principle, consent to a reunited Germany through free elections. Several months worth of diplomatic exchanges between the Western powers and the Soviet Union resulted in a flat rejection of the Soviet proposal for the following reasons:

...the Soviet Union refused to allow a United Nations commission to enter East Germany...the main obstacle... was the further Soviet condition that the reunited German state should be forbidden to join any pact or alliance...²⁴

This last point concerning neutrality of the German state was regarded by Adenauer and the Allies as risky for the future balance of Europe. A Federal Republic divorced from the Atlantic Community would have been open to subversion and eventual absorption into the Soviet bloc. If the plan were accepted, the Soviet Union would have gained a great deal. Even though the plan was rejected, the Soviets claimed a propaganda victory.

In the midst of the events surrounding the March 10th Soviet proposal, the opposition to German rearmament continued. On April 17, 1952 Niemöller restated at a Frankfurt Press Club his theory that "peace could be preserved in Europe if the Western countries do nothing which might indirectly precipitate war, and that Germany can serve best as a buffer between east and west."²⁵

In a move to formulate a common stand against rearmament, a group of widely diversified personalities were brought together at Hannover. Along with Niemöller there appeared Gustav Heinemann, the former Federal Minister of the Interior who resigned his office in protest to the issue concerning a German contribution to defense; Dr. Gereke, the former Minister for Food and Agriculture in Lower Saxony who was expelled from the CDU after having entered into trade negotiations with the Communist administration in the

Eastern Zone; and Dr. Noack, leader of the Nauheim circle and an advocate of German neutrality.²⁶

On August 20, 1952, Kurt Schumacher died, and with him a strong political voice of opposition to rearmament. His successor, Erich Ollenhauer, lacked the magnetism of Schumacher, but his standing in the party went unchallenged. On September 28, 1952, the SPD voted unanimously for a program of action to oppose the entrance of the Federal Republic into the European Defense Community. One important change to the original program that was drafted by Schumacher dealt with the bearing of arms. The new program declared that "the party will strive for an effective system of collective security in which Germany can take part on a footing of equality and without endangering her reunion."²⁷

John Foster Dulles visited the Federal Republic on February 5, 1953, and met with the leaders of the SPD and CDU. The representatives of the SPD told Dulles that they could not recognize the European Defense Community treaty without a decision of the Constitutional Court. In keeping with the new SPD program, they proposed to Dulles the formation of a German national army in the framework of a comprehensive alliance. Dulles replied that it was in the better interest of peace that French and German troops be integrated as a means of preventing a resumption of old European conflicts.²⁸

An important, although less vocal, form of opposition to the rearmament issue came from the West German Trade Union (DGB). It is interesting to note that the Union opponents of rearmament had two definite advantages in the debate:

1) the lack of enthusiasm for rearmament on the part of the minor officials and members in general;

2) The apparent unwillingness, or inability, of the government to follow precedent by offering labor domestic concessions in return for its cooperation in the foreign policy field.²⁹

In 1952, a reshuffle of the DGB occurred when the top leaders of the Union attempted to support the side of the administration. The militant temper of the Union members against rearmament, however, was still kept in the background, which is evident in the DGB 1954 resolution on the issue. Couched in vague terms, the resolution did not take a definite stand in opposition to the government's policies. It did form a consensus against competitive rearmament and called for a need to reunify Germany as a precondition to world peace. It also proclaimed the Union's readiness to participate in the maintenance of democracy. The final content of the resolution, which included supplementary changes, was patterned after the corresponding resolution that the SPD adopted at its Berlin convention that same summer. In essence, the Union's resolution presented the

DGB as being opposed to "any rearmament contribution so long as all possibilities for negotiation have not been exhausted with the goal of obtaining international reconciliation, and so long as the unity of Germany can not be obtained."³⁰

In the spring of 1955, the DGB participated in the Pauls-Kirche meeting along with various members of the SPD and church-connected groups. The manifesto that resulted from that meeting demanded a speedy reunification through negotiation rather than policy of military integration with the West.³¹ The West German Trade Union members of the older generation expressed these views for several reasons. They believed that the military protection of the Western allies, coupled with the civilian establishment of the German authorities, provided a convenient device for handling foreign and domestic issues. A number of trade-union leaders often stated that "German sovereignty has no meaning." An integrated German military would destroy the chances of a democratic development in Germany. The younger generation, however, saw the rearmament issue as an opportunity to instill the fighting spirit of former times. They argued that the vague terms of the 1954 resolution and the participation of Union's leaders in the Paul-Kirche movement were to be interpreted as pointing to a more active opposition to rearmament. The state of mind that framed a majority of the members, however, remained one of

semi-abstentionism where German labor remained on the sidelines.³²

With Adenauer's victory in the September 1953 elections came a clear mandate for the formation of the European Defense Community. The events of June 17, 1953, where an East German mass uprising was crushed by Soviet tanks, and Washington showed its inability to respond, gave emphasis to that mandate. The French rejection of the EDC on August 30, 1954, and the admission of the Federal Republic into NATO on May 5, 1955, marked an end to the first phase of opposition to West German security policy.

It is ironic that following the October 3, 1954 London Conference, Adenauer was quoted in Der Spiegel as stating:

I am 100 percent convinced that the German national Army will be a greater danger to Germany and to Europe when I'm not here any more...Use the time while I'm still living! God knows what my successor will do when I'm no longer around, when they no longer have to follow clearly prescribed paths, when they are no longer bound to Europe.³³

B. BAN THE BOMB (1957-1958)

The debate over the introduction of atomic weapons onto West German soil opens the second phase of opposition to West German security policies. On April 12, 1957, eighteen of West Germany's leading nuclear physicists created a furor in the Federal Republic and the rest of Western Europe by going on record against atomic arms. What prompted this opposition was a statement made by Adenauer on April 4,

1957, during a press conference, where he declared that "the tactical nuclear weapons were basically nothing but an improved form of artillery" and that "the Bundeswehr should not be denied the newest types of weapons."³⁴ On April 14, 1957, Adenauer spoke before a political meeting in Cologne where he replied to the Göttingen declaration. In an attempt to explain why he favored the stationing of atomic weapons on German soil, Adenauer made reference to the fact that the Federal Republic rearmed so as to save the German people from falling under the yoke of Communism and the Soviet Union. Adenauer further stated, "If the Americans have small atomic weapons, if the French, the Italians, the Belgians and the Dutch have them--and the German troops do not have them--that would mean the dissolution of the whole defense wall of the Western world against Soviet Russia."³⁵

It is important to remember that 1957 was an election year in the Federal Republic and the SPD needed such an issue to use as a cornerstone to their platform. That is why within 24 hours after the declaration by the 18 scientists and the reply by Adenauer, the planting of atomic weapons on German soil had become one of the hottest political issues in Germany's election campaign.

The opposition to atomic weapons came from three areas: the SPD, the science community, and the Protestant Church. The science community portrayed their objection to atomic

weapons in the April 12th declaration. The content of the declaration was based primarily on several political considerations. First, the atomic armament of individual nation states like France, Germany and Sweden would result in a world wide catastrophe. The great powers, therefore, have an over-riding interest in preventing the acquisition of atomic arms by small sovereign states for the sake of world peace. Second, the large-scale acquisition of atomic weapons by the West is not really a guarantee of peace and freedom. The power that these weapons represent is only useful towards the safeguarding of peace as long as they are never used. Third, to be convincing in recommending atomic disarmament to all countries, a government must convince the world that it does not want atomic arms for itself.³⁶

On the question of disarmament, the declaration further asserted that the great powers could not unilaterally forego atomic weapons under the present political conditions, but a small country such as Germany could do it. There were advantages to disarmament that were viewed by the signers of the declaration. "The Soviet Union has many other weapons and political power resources. The West holds itself to be less shy of foreign inspectors than the Soviet Union."³⁷

The declaration also called for a reduction in conventional weapons and a stabilization of the whole peace system. As C. F. von Weizsäcker stated:

We cannot remain immobilized, like a rabbit before a snake, looking at one danger only. Our purpose is not to banish the atom from the world; this would be an impossible task. We have to learn from it what needs to be changed in general; if we do not, a similar danger will be again upon us in a short time. Just to abolish atomic weapons, and otherwise to engage in wars as in the past, would be like throwing the alarm clock out of the window hoping to avoid having to get up.³⁸

In the diplomatic arena, the Soviet Union expressed its views on the introduction of atomic weapons into the Federal Republic. On April 27, 1957, and again on May 4th, the Soviets made mention of the "dangers which would be entailed by setting up nuclear weapons belonging to the Western powers on the territory of the Federal Republic."³⁹ The Soviets made further accusations that the Federal Republic intended to arm the German forces with atomic weapons. Perhaps these accusations were based on some truth in light of statements that were made by Franz-Josef Strauss, the Defense Minister. Strauss alluded to the use of tactical atomic weapons as compensation for the shortage of military manpower and the abbreviated term of service of the Bundeswehr.⁴⁰ In a March 1957 article in Aussenpolitik, Strauss stated:

...the fact remains that the position and influence of a people depend as well upon the strength and dependability of its allies as upon its own military power...Those who ask us,--quite rightly--to accept Soviet power as a reality, should after all not deny their own people the right and the opportunity to become likewise a reality.⁴¹

The second form of opposition was presented by the SPD under the leadership of Erich Ollenhauer. After the events in April, four weeks of public discussion and debate over the issue of atomic weapons swept through the Bundestag. Earlier in April, the SPD tabled a motion appealing to the Western powers to discontinue test explosions pending an agreement on their control, limitation and eventual prohibition. The SPD also demanded that the federal forces not be equipped with nuclear weapons and that the Western powers not be permitted to place their weapons upon German soil.⁴² The most vocal participants in that debate were Adenauer and Strauss, who represented the CDU, and Ollenhauer and Fritz Erler, who represented the SPD. By November 10, 1957, the Bundestag rejected the SPD proposals, voted on a limited test ban, and expressed the hope that the German people would receive an adequate protection from its allies to prevent a Soviet attack.⁴³

In the aftermath of Adenauer's overwhelming victory in the September 1957 elections, the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, proposed a peace plan to the United Nations General Assembly. The essence of the plan called for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe to include East and West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The plan received a broad approval from the SPD and its chief advisor on military affairs, Helmut Schmidt.⁴⁴ The Western powers,

including the Federal Republic, however, all rejected the plan in light of the suspicion over the advantages that would be gained by the USSR from such a plan and the USSR's successful launching of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, only two days after the original proposal.

At this point, the opposition to atomic weapons, in the form of the SPD, had lost most of its battles. Feeling that the momentum of a successful election campaign was still on his side, Adenauer called for a debate to finally decide on a resolution concerning the outcome of the atomic issue. The heated 4 day debate took place in late March 1958, with elites from the CDU and the SPD firing verbal abuses at each other.⁴⁵ The final government resolution stated that "the Federal Government would do everything in its power to bring about general controlled disarmament." The resolution went on to say that "meanwhile, the expansion of the Bundeswehr must continue in conformity with NATO requirements--It must be equipped with the most modern weapons."⁴⁶ At the same time, the resolution rejected the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states and the formation of a German confederation. In effect, the resolution virtually authorized Strauss to purchase 24 Matador missiles from the United States, along with the Honest John, Corporal and Redstone missiles.⁴⁷ Dr. Gerstenmaier, the president of the Bundestag, stated:

The equipment of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons will be carried out only if no disarmament agreement is forthcoming.⁴⁸

It is interesting to note the similarity of that concept to the resolution that was passed 21 years later over the NATO two-track decision.

In light of the public support against atomic weapons, such as the Henschel vehicle works walkout in Kassel by several hundred workers, the SPD decided to take the issue to the people by launching the Kampf dem Atomtod (Fight Atomic Death) campaign.⁴⁹ A large amount of support for the campaign came from the German Trade Union (DGB) which announced in Hamburg on March 28, 1958, its decision to organize demonstrations against nuclear weapons. The executive of the DGB stated that "it was convinced that the majority of the people did not approve of the Bundestag resolution" and demanded that the government hold a referendum. The executive called on the German people, especially workers, officials, professors, doctors, students, and mothers to join in the campaign. The DGB campaign resulted in several small strikes and protests. Workers in a Volkswagen plant laid down their tools while in other areas dock workers protested. Nearly 50,000 students rose up to protest the new weapons by marching through the streets of Hamburg carrying signs that read "Remember Hiroshima: and "still not too late" and "Beware: atomic death threatens."⁵⁰

Another form of protest centered around the idea of a public referendum. On April 10, 1958, the city assembly of Frankfurt voted 42 to 15 to hold such a referendum, while similar proposals were made in Bremen, Lower Saxony, Hesse and North-Rhine Westphalia.⁵¹ The CDU attitude toward such a referendum was that any referendum was a manipulation of the constitution, which excludes such political activities; the CDU referred the issue to the Constitutional Court.

Meanwhile, more demonstrations occurred throughout April 1958. In Hamburg, for example, workers and students marched through the streets and brought public transportation to a halt. With the organizational help of the SPD, 7,000 Germans demonstrated in Bremen and another 5,000 in Mannheim. The "Fight Atomic Death" campaign drew little support from West Berliners, however, as the SPD witnessed a growing dilemma. The campaign's most willing supporters, namely the Communists, were stopped from participating in the movement, because their association with the campaign spelled out its end. For Berliners, the short range of the missiles to be installed in the West presented a potential danger in war and they were more receptive to this argument than ones concerning ideology or religion.⁵²

The religious opposition to nuclear weapons was less significant than that which came from SPD or the Trade Unions. Dr. Niemöller once again attempted to use his

pulpit in the Evangelical Church as a sounding board for advocating the campaign against atomic death. Niemöller, however, was later banned from using the pulpit in such a manner, due to his accusation that those who supported atomic weapons were atheists.⁵³

By the end of the summer of 1958, the broad-based grass roots of the movement had wilted.⁵⁴ One reason for its decline was the Constitutional Court's decision not to permit referenda in the SPD-ruled city states of Hamburg and Bremen. Another reason dealt with the success of the CDU in the Land elections of North-Rhine Westphalia, an SPD stronghold. A more detailed analysis of the movement's performance is given in the next chapter.

C. THE NEW "PEACE MOVEMENT" (1977-1982)

1. Enhanced Radiation Weapons (ERW)

In the years that followed the 1957-1958 debate over the introduction of nuclear weapons in West Germany, two internal developments deprived the opposition of its clear anti-nuclear and pro-disengagement identity. First, in a new bid for political advantage, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) decided to change its image and strategy by adopting a new platform. In November 1959, it jettisoned its position concerning class warfare along with its opposition to rearmament and argued that the Federal Republic must play its full role in the defense of Western Europe within the

framework of NATO.⁵⁵ Second, the protest over the Vietnam War, coupled with the West German student revolts of the late 1960s and early 1970s overshadowed any opposition to rearmament.⁵⁶ The campaign against enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) witnessed a rekindling of the anti-rearmament movement of the late 1950s and introduced the third phase of opposition.

In May 1977, a meeting of the Atlantic Alliance discussed the possibilities of improving NATO's defense efforts by adding ER weapons to its arsenal.⁵⁷ A Washington Post article later revealed the remarks of that meeting to the public, which resulted in several debates both in the United States and Europe.⁵⁸

The most intense debate occurred in West Germany where the bulk of the ER warheads were to be deployed and would probably be used in the event of a Soviet attack. One should recall that when tactical nuclear weapons were first introduced into NATO, the Federal Republic had many reservations about their possible use. In 1962, Helmut Schmidt voiced a grave concern over the civilian damage that might occur as a result of a tactical nuclear exchange on German soil. He stated, "When the defense of Europe is seen to entail its nuclear destruction, the European incentive to permit the use of nuclear weapons on its soil diminishes rapidly."⁵⁹ In 1976, Schmidt repeated his concern when as

Chancellor he signed a German White Paper on national defense:

The initial use of nuclear weapons is not intended so much to bring about a military decision as to achieve political effect. The intent is to persuade the attacker to reconsider his intention, to desist in his aggression and to withdraw...⁶⁰

The ER weapon was tacitly endorsed by the CDU/CSU and the right wing of the SPD, given the notion that the weapon was presented as being less destructive. One of the strongest criticisms, however, came from within the SPD left and was represented by Egon Bahr, who was at that time the General Secretary of the party and the architect of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. He declared the bomb to be a "symbol for the perversion of human thinking" and claimed that the development of such a weapon proved that "mankind is about to go mad." In continuing his criticism, Bahr also noted: "It seems to be an ideal of latest progress that it is easier to clear away human bodies than to remove the rubble of cities and factories."⁶¹ In an article that appeared in the SPD newspaper Vorwärts, Bahr attacked the desire to purchase ER weapons by labeling it as a kind of political greed where "the opposition fall all over themselves in their attempt to spend beyond their budget just to acquire a new type of weapon."⁶²

While opposing ER weapons in a moral sense, Bahr also doubted that they could act as an effective deterrent.

The argument centered around his belief that the weapon lowers the nuclear threshold due to its smaller yield, that it can be used more purposefully, destroys less and, therefore, has an enhanced probability of use. Bahr went on to criticize the deterrent capability of ER weapons by arguing that the Soviets would probably have a similar weapon stockpiled shortly after the U.S. deployment, thereby neutralizing that level of U.S. capability.⁶³

Perhaps the most convincing of Bahr's arguments pertained to the effect that ER weapons would have on the growing relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic:

Detente demands a long term policy creating confidence through new agreements...Detente demands steps to be made toward reduction and arms limitation and not toward intensified armaments and the introduction of new systems which would create new instability.⁶⁴

Other members of the SPD offered similar arguments. Willy Brandt, for example, expressed his opposition to ER weapons by making reference to the danger of lowering the nuclear threshold. Weapons of this type "must not become the substitute for a conventional defense capability."⁶⁵ Karsten Voigt, a spokesman for the younger members of the SPD left, stressed that the ER weapons blurred the "firebreak" between conventional and nuclear war and pointed out that those weapons could lead to a limited nuclear war fought only in Europe, thus creating a process decoupling

the United States from its obligation to help defend Western Europe.⁶⁶ Christian Kraus and Alfons Pawelczyk both commented on the Soviet threat and the balance of forces, while Horst Ehmke noted that the deployment of ER weapons raised certain risks for the success of the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik:

If millions of people yearly can visit each other in divided Germany today...then this is a practical success for the human rights of these people. We do not want to jeopardize this practical success by making a show of muscle.⁶⁷

In December 1977, Hans Günter Brauch summarized the objections against ER weapons by compiling a list of ten specific arguments:

- 1) The neutron weapon is not a strategic necessity.
- 2) The neutron weapon lowers the nuclear threshold and makes war once again possible.
- 3) The danger exists of the use against friendly units and against the civilian population.
- 4) The costs of the neutron weapon endanger a cost-effective conventional anti-tank defense.
- 5) The introduction of the neutron weapon makes nonproliferation efforts more difficult.
- 6) The neutron bomb endangers the ongoing arms control negotiations.
- 7) The neutron weapon is not clean.

8) Against the introduction of the neutron weapon exist numerous objections of international law.

9) Storage of neutron warheads (on West German soil) can lead to a burden on German-American relations.

10) Psychological weakening of the West.⁶⁸

On January 20, 1978, the Federal Security Council determined the official West German position which emphasized:

1) The Federal Republic is not a nuclear-weapons state and therefore does not participate in decisions on the production of nuclear weapons.

2) In the event of an American decision for production, opportunities ought to be used to bring ER weapons into arms limitation negotiations.

3) The government is prepared to declare that it will allow the stationing of ER weapons on German territory, if within two years after the American President's production decision the West has not abandoned deployment because of appropriate results from arms limitation negotiations.

4) In the interests of the alliance, it would be necessary in any case not to base ER weapons only on German soil.

5) The Federal Republic must not be assigned any special position with the nuclear powers the U.S., France,

and Great Britain that would separate it from the other NATO partners; at the same time, the relationship with the Soviet Union and the other neighboring European countries must be taken into consideration.⁶⁹

In light of this position, on March 19, 1978, West Germany as well as its allies in NATO consented to a three part program that dealt with the U.S. insistence on a public European acceptance of ER weapons deployment prior to President Carter's production decision. In essence, the program called for the U.S. to make a production decision public, attach the ER weapons to arms control and reduction talks between the East and West and stipulate that if, after two years, the negotiations failed to result in any agreements, then the NATO allies would accept ER weapons. Thus, either the United States or the Soviet Union would force the weapon on the Europeans, and the Germans could not be blamed in either case.⁷⁰

Due to a number of reasons, which included a lack of understanding of the West German perception, President Carter postponed a decision on full-scale production of the ER weapons in April 1978.⁷¹ Schmidt, who was open to criticism from the CDU/CSU and the SPD left, remarked in an interview:

With hindsight I think the President has kept his options open with a sober, sound strategic decision. Of course, the same decision would have been better if we [Germans] hadn't had to go through the irritating process of the last few months.⁷²

Apart from the criticism within the West German government, German opposition to ER weapons flowed from various environmental and pacifist groups. One such form of opposition sprang from the Green Action Future (GAZ) founded by Herbert Gruhl, a former CDU member. The GAZ executive committee consisted of scientists and freelancers who at one time were all members of the Federal Republic's four major parties. The relatively new party has its base in Bonn and claims that its platform is centered around the principles found in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Portions of the Green Manifesto point out the party's relationship with environmental issues:

Our policies have to take into account our children and grandchildren and future generations. The conservation of the ecological bases of all life--air, water, earth, the plant, and animal world--are preconditions of their survival.⁷³

The GAZ adopted a program for foreign policy which called for "partnership and peaceful co-existence with all countries, including those of the East bloc, rejects all atomic weapons and in particular the 'life-annihilating' neutron bomb, and aims for an atomic-free zone in Europe and gradual disarmament among all powers."⁷⁴

As a postscript to the ER weapons issue, the Carter administration revised its policy in October 1978, by allocating funds for the delivery vehicles and authorizing the production of certain warhead components. Schmidt was

left with no other option than to re-iterate the January 1978 Federal Security Council position.

2. The NATO Two Track Decision

This dual decision (of December 1979) by the Alliance is militarily an indispensable component of the strategy of the West, politically a test of the solidarity of the Alliance. In the present international situation, anyone who questions this dual decision, or one of its two parts, brings the Alliance into question.⁷⁵

This statement by Helmut Schmidt reflects the culmination of long and arduous debates that occurred throughout Western Europe and the United States prior to the NATO two track decision.

As far back as November 1976, the Nuclear Planning Group first decided to design a program for the ground-launched Cruise missile (GLCM). The decision to add new intermediate-range nuclear forces to the European arsenal was principally in response to the Soviet production and deployment of the sophisticated SS-20 missile system. For its part, prior to 1969, the United State maintained a total of 201 medium and intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles in Britain, Italy and Turkey. By 1969, all of these weapons had been withdrawn from Europe with the remaining nuclear force consisting of the Pershing I SRBM, the Poseidon SLBM and various types of aircraft such as the F-111, F-4, A-6 and A-7.⁷⁶ The foreseeable danger in the growing imbalance between the Soviet and NATO forces in

Europe was clearly expressed by Schmidt when he addressed the SPD Caucus of the Bundestag on February 6, 1979:

When the Soviet Union puts into service every year 30 to 50 new SS-20 missiles, each with at least three warheads, and also puts into service 30 to 50 new Backfire bombers, one can see that in the course of the 1980s...the Soviet Union could theoretically be put in the position of using military intimidation for political purposes.⁷⁷

Herbert Wehner, the SPD parliamentary leader, took an opposing view to Schmidt's assessment that the new Soviet weapons were offensive in nature. In representing the views of the SPD left, Wehner argued that the levels of nuclear destructive power already held by the East and West were awesome, and that further Western increases in weapons from the West will accelerate an arms race, resulting in defensive Soviet countermeasures.⁷⁸ In May 1979, Wehner modified his argument by stating that some new NATO INF might be necessary, while insisting that NATO and the Federal Republic consider arms limitation and disarmament a top priority.⁷⁹

Throughout the March 1979 INF debate in the Federal Republic, representatives from the SPD left contended that the Soviet military build-up was not aggressive in nature. Fearing that the modernization of NATO's nuclear arsenal might disrupt the process of detent, they advocated the use of INF only as a bargaining chip in negotiations which they expected to be successful in removing any need for actual INF deployment.

Although the Soviet threat was more readily recognized by the conservative element of the Schmidt government, the pressure from the left wing of the SPD as well as some domestic political considerations more or less impelled Schmidt to move towards the notion of arms negotiations rather than actual deployment. Thus he coupled the pace of INF modernization to that of arms control.

Schmidt stated:

Concrete modernization measures could be limited to the extent which arms control negotiations--e.g., in Salt II--would effectively limit Eurostrategic systems in East and West.⁸⁰

The Schmidt government's central points concerning its NATO two track policy follow:

- 1) The members of NATO (except for France) have jointly decided on modernization and are jointly responsible for it.

- 2) The necessary decision in favor of modernization was linked with an offer to the Soviet Union for immediate negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons. The ideal objective of such negotiations would be to make the deployment of these weapons superfluous.

- 3) Our 1954 renunciation of atomic weapons will remain unchanged. The new medium-range weapons will be produced by the United States only and remain under American control. Deciding on their use is the sole responsibility of the American President. We do not have a "finger on the trigger."

4) The new medium-range nuclear weapons are to be stationed in Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and in our country. This is to guarantee that our country cannot be isolated.⁸¹

The December 1979 NATO decision brought with it a re-awakening of the anti-rearmament and pacifist groups that were discussed in the previous two phases. Unlike the other two phases, however, the new opposition from outside of the government is a broad-based coalition comprising more than 1400 different organizations including pacifist religious groups, trade unions, leftists, Communists, environmentalists and some alternative groups, all of which are linked together by the common desire to campaign against the INF deployment.⁸²

The strongest voice within the religious community has been the Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD). The increased tension on the political scene has led to a revival of the EKD's long post-war struggle for peace. Over the past 32 years the efforts of the EKD have led to several contributions to the nuclear debate. The most important contribution is derived from the Heidelberg Theses on War and Peace in the Atomic Age (1959). The insights found within these areas lead to the following conclusion:

The Church must recognize participation in the attempt to safeguard peace in freedom by the presence of nuclear weapons as still being a possible Christian way of acting.⁸³

In light of the present INF issue, however, the EKD endorsed the assertion that "War is contrary to the will of God." The Church further stipulated that its judgement permitting a Christian's participation in a nuclear war is "not valid for all time, but bound to a specific geopolitical situation, and can thus be overtaken by events."⁸⁴ The EKD presented its position on tactical nuclear weapons in this manner:

The continuance of wars makes it necessary...to attempt to prevent the use of nuclear armaments in local conflicts...and considers it to be a tragic mistake if one were to imagine that the continuance of limited wars constituted a stable situation. It is not the exclusion of nuclear weapons from warfare,⁸⁵ but the exclusion of war itself that must be our aim.

At the initiative of the Council of the EKD, a working group called the Committee for Public Responsibility was formed and held a conference on "Militarism and the Arms Race" from 26 to 28 March 1979. The purpose of the conference was to draw the guide lines for a position paper for the Church on the INF issue. The committee concluded that:

Priority must be given to a limitation of the arms race and to fresh efforts to achieve disarmament in the light of the hazards attaching to weapons technology.⁸⁶

The Committee also made it clear that the Church could not accept the notion of living without the protection of armaments, due to the possibility of all types of political blackmail and military subjugation. As alternatives to the

present issue concerning the "highly unstable deterrent system," the Committee pronounced that:

1) Military defense measures are justified in order to preserve a country's self-determination. The dilemma arises in one's interpretation of a weapon's offensive or defensive nature.

2) Other less threatening possibilities to ensure peace should be sought out to include those measures that serve detente and strengthen international law.⁸⁷

Another strong voice within the religious community of the Federal Republic comes from the Catholic Church through its Pax Christi organization. Their platform is based on the assumption that force and militarism are being systematically practiced and rehearsed and that they can therefore be systematically forgotten through disuse.⁸⁸

According to this platform, the reduction of force can be achieved through full cooperation of all concerned and within the framework of detente. In theory, this calls for a continuous exchange of views between the East and West in order to prevent a disastrous conflict which could otherwise occur due to misperceptions and misunderstandings. The Pax Christi organization cited as an example the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan where "punishing the other side by isolating it for a wrong move, could threaten the existence of both sides."⁸⁹ Accordingly, Pax Christi places a great

deal of emphasis on detente and unilateral disarmament gestures:

General and complete disarmament as the objective of any peace policy aimed at reducing force and increasing social justice is beyond question. In view of the dangers inherent in the present overkill potential, disarmament remains a pressing imperative even if it entails (comparatively small) risks. The willingness to accept these risks must be taken as a yardstick of society's ability to make peace.⁹⁰

The Christian churches appear to be an excellent recruiting ground for the pacifist members of the campaign against INF deployment. Despite agreement on the basic principle of non-violence, pacifism within West Germany can be categorized into three main variants. The first type is termed legal or organized pacifism, which only condemns the illegal form of violence. This type of pacifism actually permits the use of force which is regulated by the law. The second type is termed radical-religious pacifism, which will not oppose violence with violence, not even of the legal sort, and is thus opposed to self-defense. The third type is termed radical-totalitarian pacifism, which opposes the use of force as a means of erecting a world empire free of violence. Manfred Wörner, the deputy leader of the CDU/CSU Bundestag Fraktion and new Defense Minister of the Federal Republic, further describes German pacifism as a "highly differentiated phenomenon." Wörner refers to at least five basic categories of pacifist currents that are reflected in the new peace movement:

1) The "pacifism of faith", which attracts essentially representatives of organized religions and appeals to the conscience of the individual citizen.

2) The "pacifism of fear", which represents a mixture of war psychosis and fear of the future.

3) The "pacifism of welfare", whose adherents are basically intent upon protecting their own economic well-being against the rough waters that face the German economy--and doing so by scuttling the Federal Republic's defense outlays in favor of heightened subsidies to the welfare state.

4) The "pacifism of expedience", whose representatives take their orders straight from Moscow in working diligently for the unilateral disarmament of the West.

5) A "reunification pacifism", which might also be called a "nationalist-neutralist pacifism". Its representatives have little in common with the naively idealistic youth who make up the bulk of the peace movement. Instead they come from intellectual circles of the SPD left.⁹¹

The pacifist factions offer some of the more radical alternatives to official security policy. Their aim, in general, follows closely behind their motto, "Make Peace Without Weapons." They hold to the belief that the Soviet Union would be more than happy to cease with its arms

build-up given the proof that no military threat exists from the West. This is to be accomplished by Western unilateral disarmament moves.

The church influence within the peace movement is extremely strong, which is evident in the Christian-inspired peace groups that have blossomed all over West Germany. Some of these groups include "Christians for Disarmament", "Living Without Arms", and the Shalom groups. The Federation of German Catholic Youth, with its 650,000 members, provides a sizeable support for the peace campaign.⁹² On June 18, 1981, a large gathering of lay Protestants met at the Protestant Church Conference in Hamburg. The discussion between the 150,000 participants was largely dominated by the issue of disarmament. During the course of events, Helmut Schmidt took part in a televised debate with several representatives of the Protestant Church. The debate centered around the INF issue. Concerning the Chancellor's view of what the correct relationship between the Church and the peace movement should be, Schmidt replied:

The people in the Church must make sure that they do not lapse, under the pressure of the peace movement, into a God-is-with-us theology, i.e. into an inverted imperialism a la William II. During the days of Emperor William II, the belt with which soldiers were issued bore the inscription: God is with us. And people imagined 70 years ago that the policy pursued then...was indeed blessed by God and that it accorded with God's wishes. Today, we must pay attention lest many people with critical views on the policy which is

necessary for Germany start to believe that their opinions are the only ones of substance in God's eyes. We have no use for a God-is-with-us theology or policy in the sense that somebody holding a different view has the sole right to invoke God and Christ.⁹³

Despite Schmidt's views, the Christian churches have not only succeeded in establishing a good rapport with the many factions of the peace movement within West Germany, but have become an important link to the many church-backed organizations throughout Europe and the United States.

Perhaps the most centralized organization within the new peace movement and one that is a national political party is called the Greens. The origin of the Greens dates back to the middle of the 1970s when West German nuclear power plants were being considered. As an environmental group, the Greens originally formed their political goals around protecting the environment from the ravages of industry and urbanization. Thus their campaign against the nuclear power plants was seen as a means of protecting that environment. With time, the Greens began to face the issue of disarmament and the prevention of war, as well as the the more traditional political programs such as:

- 1) guaranteed apprenticeship programs for young people and the right to a job;
- 2) a 35-hour work week;
- 3) declarations against bureaucracy and government corruption;

- 4) a ban on cigarettes and liquor advertising
- 5) speed limits for all German roads, especially the autobahns.⁹⁴

The Alternative List (AL), a political party that has its grass roots in West Berlin, is the quasi-partner to the Greens. The party is dedicated to the various problems that plague West Berlin such as the shortage of low-cost housing. The ideology of the AL, however, differs entirely from that of the Greens. The AL "uphold an idea of 'individual self-fulfillment' over the demands and pressures of modern society, reject the consumer society as being too conformist and passive, and view a return to a form of pre-industrial society as a goal worth striving for."⁹⁵

Aside from the major religious and political factions within the new peace movement, several notable West German personalities have pledged their support to the movement's protest over INF deployment. Gert Bastian, a retired Major General of the Bundeswehr, is currently the Greens top advisor on military affairs. Bastian, together with seven other retired military leaders from Italy, Norway, Portugal, Greece, Netherlands and France sent a memorandum to the Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers of the Alliance which presented their views on the INF issue.⁹⁶ An examination of the memorandum reveals several interesting insights pertaining to the perceptions of these highly

influential personalities. First, concerning the nature of the "real" threat, Bastian and the other co-signers of the memorandum state that we are threatened by:

a description of our adversaries that alienates people from the idea of peace and strengthens models of thinking and behavior which favor conflict and war, thus making them unable to accept a cooperative existence of all peoples;

adventurous policies measuring the value of international relations only with the scale of one's own benefits and not recognizing--or even rejecting--opportunities for negotiations on vital issues of our era;

our lack of understanding of the interests of Third World countries, their strive for independence and their just claims for economic development, social progress, and national prestige including non-interference into their internal affairs;

arrogance towards socially disadvantaged population groups in our countries who carry the whole burden of inflationary price increase, mass unemployment, bad housing, and broad scale crime and who do not seem ready any longer to accept that huge sums flow into armament instead of being used to improve their living conditions.

Second, they display a deep concern over what they view as irrational behavior by the NATO countries in thinking that an arms build-up in Western Europe will guarantee more safety. They see an increasing madness to nuclear armament which must inevitably end in a disaster. The only course for NATO, therefore, is pursuance of detente with the Soviet Union. To aid in their argument, the eight former NATO military leaders draw upon the Harmel Report of December 1967 which relates to the future tasks of the Alliance:

Above all, a constructive use of the Alliance in the interest of detente can pave the way to peace and stability in Europe. USSR and U.S. participation will be necessary to find effective solutions for the European political problems.⁹⁸

The former military leaders offer several alternatives to the missile deployment:

1) Based on the fact that the Soviet Union did not use its conventional superiority to threaten Western Europe during the post-war years, NATO should seek to go back to a strictly conventional force along with the Warsaw Pact.

2) NATO should combine its military policy with programs of economic aid in concert with the EEC.

3) On the basis of a de-nuclearized zone in Europe, NATO's strategy should be designed around a modern conventional armed force which can present a high deterrent value; a highly developed defense that can dispense with long-range offensive weapons; the organization of homeland militias to make military occupation by an enemy force impossible.

4) Increasing national sovereignty within NATO and abolishing the types of situations where the U.S. can carry out its own nuclear policy without consulting its West European allies.

5) In the interests of detente, NATO should cease from trying to expand the size of the Alliance.

Bastian further argues that President Reagan's "Zero Option" policy, which calls for the dismantling of certain Soviet intermediate-range missiles (SS-4s, SS-5s, and SS-20s) in exchange for halting the deployment of the ground-launched Cruise and Pershing II missiles is totally one sided. Bastian stated, "After all, it [the zero option] calls for the dismantling of already existing nuclear weapons down to zero by the East, while none of the West's systems that are already in place (Pershing I) would be reduced."⁹⁹ It is evident that Bastian has misinterpreted the meaning of "Zero Option" and of the existing INF balance. The Pershing I, for example, is incapable of striking the Soviet Union from Western Europe, while the USSR has numerous systems capable of striking Western Europe in addition to the SS-4s, SS-5s, and SS-20s.

Similar views and alternatives have been presented by a retired Luftwaffe colonel, Alfred Mechttersheimer, who is a well-known critic of the Tornado MRCA Procurement, as well as a member of the "Alternative Defense" Working Group.¹⁰⁰ Mechttersheimer cites several arguments to substantiate his anti-nuclear position. First, U.S. strategic thinking has shifted from deterrence to a war-fighting capability. Second, the sophisticated SS-20 has been "vastly overestimated" and could only carry one warhead. [The weapon actually has a MIRV warhead.] Third, Reagan "regards

detente as possibly a task of secondary importance."¹⁰¹

Mechtersheimer's answer to the question of U.S. interference into West German affairs lies in a "massive public criticism and collective citizen's protest against the nuclear modernization that will enlarge the German government's room for maneuver vis-a-vis the U.S.."¹⁰²

On December 9, 1980, one of the numerous initiatives that Mechtersheimer called for took place at a press conference in Bielefeld where a small group within the SPD (originally 150), calling themselves the "Courage for a Better Future," appealed to the SPD national executive, the SPD Bundestag Faction and the Chancellor. While touching upon some of the previously mentioned arguments to the modernization issue, they urged that:

1) Negotiations on limiting theater nuclear weapons systems in Europe be taken up without further delay.

2) By repealing the NATO decision, the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe will be prevented.

3) The Vienna MBFR negotiations are to be speeded up.

4) No neutron bombs should be deployed to the Federal Republic.

5) The arms budget should be cut in favor of social investments (social security instead of missiles.)

6) A European conference on disarmament should be convened and carried through as soon as possible.¹⁰³

A similar petition known as the Krefeld Appeal was organized and sponsored by the Greens on November 16, 1980. The petition attracted nearly 2 million signatures, in only a few months, which may indicate the popular attraction to the issue of disarmament in West Germany. The rapid growth rate of the new peace movement became evident in several large scale demonstrations that occurred in the fall of 1981. On October 10, 1981, 250,000 people took to the streets and parks in Bonn to protest the 1979 NATO decision. Signs with slogans such as "WE ARE NOT AMERICA'S GUINEA PIGS" and "WE DON'T WANT TO FIGHT REAGAN'S WAR" point to what is perhaps the heart of the problem, Ich Habe Angst (I am afraid).¹⁰⁴

Through the rest of 1981 and into the summer of 1982 the new peace movement gained in momentum. On June 10, 1982, President Reagan visited the Federal Republic in order to take part in a NATO summit. Upon his arrival in Bonn, 300,000 West Germans staged a well planned demonstration to protest U.S. defense policies. Initially, the major organizers of the demonstration, "Action for Reconciliation" (a West Berlin-based group with ties to the EKD), and the Greens party feared that the protest would result in a rallying support for the anti-American sentiment that

predominantly rests with the younger generations of West Germany. What did result, however, was a full endorsement for a worldwide end to nuclear arms and a withdrawal of those weapons from both East and West European countries.¹⁰⁵

The West German peace movement has made attempts to join forces with other similar campaigns in Western Europe and the United States. In June 1982, an appeal was sent to the American people through an organization called the "Gruppe Friedens-Manifest" and appeared as an article in the New York Times.¹⁰⁶ The appeal stated the need for regional disarmament and a change in regional arms policies as well as a defense policy based on non-offensive weapons:

We stand for a nuclear-free Europe in East and West, based on the lowest level of exclusively defensive conventional armaments. Carrying out these measures would considerably lessen the danger of war...The risks involved in this alternative...are small compared to the risk...of the arms race and the policy of deterrence.¹⁰⁷

The appeal sought to tie the Nuclear Freeze campaign in the United States with the movement in Western Europe and, in particular, West Germany:

...we are impressed by the strong and growing peace movement in America and by its efforts to freeze the nuclear arms race on both sides. Our efforts here are closely connected with that goal...In all our political activities we intend to stress the congruence of the goals of the European and the American peace movements ...Let us together in the United States and in Europe commit ourselves to bringing an end to the arms race...¹⁰⁸

The appeal was signed by more than 200 prominent clergy, academicians, authors and members of parliament.

The same common thread that unites the various factions of the West German peace movement also unites those of other West European countries, thus making the peace movement international in scope. Mient-Jan Faber, the leader of the Dutch Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV), which serves as a model to anti-nuclear organizations in other parts of Western Europe, has stated that "Arms control, the step-by-step approach, has not worked. Our over-all goal, which is all nuclear weapons out of Europe, will be a long process, but it can begin here."¹⁰⁹ The peace movement in Great Britain, under the leadership of the campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), has rapidly grown to over 250,000 members in the last two years. The latest anti-nuclear movement to develop is the Italian "Movement for Peace and Disarmament," which organized more than 200,000 protestors in Rome during October 1981.¹¹⁰

With respect to West Germany, we have so far examined the new peace movement from its factions within the religious community, the environmentalists, and some prominent individual supporters. What remains is the dogmatic and undogmatic "new leftist." One of the basic elements of the new peace movement has been the willingness to accept persons and groups with a wide variety of concepts

and aims. A vast majority of the movement's members are between the ages of 18 and 25. There exist within this age bracket a number of complex alternative and leftist groups, a product of the late 1960s and early 1970s when West German youths protested against the Vietnam War and, in particular, against the conservative educational structure of the West German universities.¹¹¹

Within these factions, several interesting features of the peace movement begin to surface. Richard Löwenthal states that "the return of the repressed in a society whose collective sense of identity is disturbed may well be the deepest reason for the raging inner restlessness behind the outward stability."¹¹² What he is referring to is a type of counter-society or alternative culture which abhors the labor-oriented industrial society and favors new values of self-realization. William Griffith points out that this "romantic disdain for materialism, consumerism, economic growth, bureaucracy, liberalism, bourgeois lifestyle and conventional morality" is not a new phenomenon, but actually began prior to World War I and existed in the Weimar Republic.¹¹³ The German term Angst has a special meaning to these social dropouts. In its literal translation, the word means fear. In figurative terms, the word refers to a long-time fear of nuclear war and has become a kind of cult within these groups, supporting their claim that an

alternative society, one without politics, is the only way to survive.

Along with these youth oriented Alternative groups are the various leftist organizations who, as well as the Alternatives, became the recipients of the defunct Extra Parliamentary Opposition (APO), a protest movement of the late 1960s which directed a political and cultural revolution against the dominant norms of West German society. It was from this organization that many of West Germany's terrorists such as the Baader-Meinhof gang got their start. The leftist organizations, in general, include the radical "K-groups" (the new left), the SPD left with their Young Socialists (Jusos), the FDP Youth Group, the Youth Committee of the West German Trade Union (DGB), and the Moscow oriented Communists.¹¹⁴

Politically, the Jusos constitute the most important leftist organization for the younger generation. The Jusos passed a resolution on peace, detente and disarmament at their congress in 1980. The resolution listed the major factors behind the new fear of war. All pointed to the fault of the United States in its "policy of military superiority," while at the same time the resolution played down the role of the Soviet SS-20s.¹¹⁵

Finally, the new peace movement has a small, but highly visible counterpart in the German Democratic Republic

through the East German Protestant Church. The movement's slogan is "Swords into Ploughshares" and calls for a reduction of SS-20 missiles and tanks in Eastern Europe. In February 1982, the East German movement staged a demonstration in Dresden with 5000 protesting young Germans waving the familiar slogan, "Make Peace Without Weapons." Unfortunately, it is difficult to know the nature and extent of the movement, but we do know that the Church distributed approximately 20,000 armbands with the outlawed sword into ploughshare slogan on them. The most important outcome of these demonstrations in East Germany is the feeling of a positive unification with their counterparts in the West.¹¹⁶

III. THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The policies of governments are heavily influenced by their domestic politics, and these politics make them heavily dependent on the political impact of these kinds of movements...

A. COMPARISON OF THE THREE PHASES

1. The Opposition (1950-1958)

A comparison of the three phases of opposition to West German security policies, in terms of the success or failure of the movement's ability to change those policies, will prove that the current peace movement shows a greater potential to affect decision-making in the Federal Republic than the past two phases.

Between the years 1950 and 1956, a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe was certainly unpopular among the masses in West Germany. Poll results showed that opposition to rearmament increased from 45 percent in the fall of 1950 to 50 percent in 1951, while only 22-26 percent of those surveyed approved.² A poll taken in January 1951, showed that 46 percent of the respondents thought that it would be better to "try to unite with East Germany, and as a neutral nation...keep out of conflicts between East and West."³

Although a high percentage of West Germans disapproved of rearmament, the issue was not the highest

priority of concerns (see Table 3.1). During most of the postwar period, West Germans were more concerned about the state of the economy and, in particular, their "daily bread." Their chief political concern was the partition of Germany, and her position between East West. Most of the West Germans who were polled, however, indicated that they would oppose any concession that would result in an increase in communism in the Federal Republic. Further surveys suggested that, as long as the cold war lasted, West Germans preferred to side with the United States and its other European allies. In 1952, an Institut für Demoskopie poll showed that two-thirds of the respondents said they felt threatened by the Soviets, and only 15 percent said they did not.⁴

TABLE 3.1

The Most Urgent Task Facing the Federal Government 1950-1957
(percentages)

	Reunification	Housing	Employment	Refugees
1950	1	14	25	14
1951	12	10	11	12
1952	16	10	7	8
1953	12	9	8	6
1954	14	13	7	3
1955	21	9	3	2
1956	25	6	1	1
1957	27	5	1	0

Source: EMNID Poll, Der Spiegel, April 17, 1957

This attitude towards the West began to change from 1955 to 1956. Until that time, West Germans were fairly certain that, if the Soviets attacked, the Western powers would defeat them. By 1956, the Institute for Market and Opinion Research (EMNID) found that over half of their respondents preferred a policy of neutrality, while identification with the West slipped to slightly over one-third.⁵ The reason for the increased attitude towards neutralism reflected a deep-seated fear of war, especially one that might be fought on German soil. In 1956, West Germans indicated in several surveys that they viewed the Soviets as being equal to the United States and they were not sure that victory in war could be achieved by the West. Furthermore, West German public opinion was divided on the preferable course, an avoidance of involvement in the East-West struggle for fear of atomic war, or the seeking of safety in close association with the West for fear of the Soviet Union.⁶ A Deutsches Institut für Volksumfragen (DIVO) poll that was released March 1, 1957, showed that from 1953 to 1956 those in favor of non-involvement increased from 20 percent to 30 percent. Early in 1957, however, as a result of Soviet intervention in Hungary, the figure fell back to 20 percent.

With respect to the issue of rearmament, the concern did not compare in urgency with reunification and economic

considerations. Several polls showed that only 10 percent of the respondents considered it a pressing issue since 1951.⁷ Most of the opposition to rearmament came from German women and to a lesser extent from the young men. In a May 1955 poll, 46 percent of the men who were surveyed approved of rearmament, while 47 percent of the women opposed it. Within the 18-24 year age bracket, 48 percent opposed rearmament, while the majority of those who favored it appeared to be in the 60 year or older bracket.⁸ Thus the West German government's handling of the rearmament issue was not driven by domestic popular pressure, but as a response to international tensions.

But it would be altogether too simplistic to accuse the West German government of being totally unmindful of public attitudes. The levels of German armament planned for by NATO in the early 1950s (500,000 men with 18 months compulsory service) were substantially reduced. By March 1959, the West German armed forces were forecast to have no more than 200,000 men with a conscription lasting only 12 months.⁹ At a time when France and Great Britain were spending 7 and 8 percent of their national income on defense, West Germany's contribution was only 4 percent. This was not an indication of bad faith on the part of the Adenauer government, but suggests the probability that the government had to limit its defense contribution, due to domestic political concerns.¹⁰

The failure of the opposition to stop the Federal Republic's desire to rearm is evident in two events. The first event was the 1953 general election, where the CDU under Adenauer gained an absolute majority in the Bundestag for the first time. It is interesting to note that the election occurred at a time when Adenauer's policy toward rearmament was not a politically popular one. Despite Kurt Schumacher's vigorous attempt to gain a political advantage from the rearmament issue, Adenauer made it clear that no matter what the temper of mass opinion, he refused to reverse his position. Schumacher died before the 1953 elections took place, and, although there still remained widespread popular opposition to rearmament, "the promised restoration of German sovereignty and of the gains in Germany's international position impressed many voters."¹¹

The second and most obvious event was West Germany's joining NATO on May 5, 1955. By 1954, the issue of rearmament had to be resolved, as it was a precondition for the Federal Republic's admittance into NATO. What this meant for the West Germans was the choice between gaining sovereignty for the Federal Republic through military security, or the possibility that the Soviet Union might allow the reunification of a neutralized Germany. A 1954 Institut für Demoskopie poll asked its respondents the following question, "What do you think: should we enter

into negotiations with the Russians over the reunification of Germany only after we have put up German troops in West Germany, or is it more advantageous for reunification to negotiate with the Russians before we have a West German army?"¹² The results showed that 36 percent said rearmament should come first; 31 percent felt that negotiations were more important; 21 percent were opposed to rearmament under any circumstances; and 12 percent were undecided.¹³ Thus the opposition to rearmament in the first phase appeared to have been ineffective.

The second phase offers a clearer example of the lack of influence that the opposition had on the Federal Republic's decision-making body. In 1957 and 1958, the government's decision to allow nuclear weapons upon West German soil triggered an unprecedented crisis in German domestic politics. Acting as a climax to the rearmament debate of the 1950s, it was a case where the government once again found itself in solid opposition to public opinion.

As the debate over nuclear weapons began, Adenauer was caught in several political embarrassments. First, his statement in April 1957, which referred to tactical nuclear weapons as "merely a further development of artillery," touched off the whole atomic issue. As the eighteen scientists went to the public to protest such an outrageous statement, Adenauer issued an ill-considered response that

further riled the public. In all fairness to the late Chancellor, it should be pointed out that his political embarrassments were partially a result of the confusions that, to this day, exist in western military policy in general.¹⁴

Adenauer was a staunch believer in the use of conventional forces to thwart a Soviet attack. A New York Times article in July 1956, however, reported the "Radford Plan" which called for a radical cut back in U.S. conventional forces. The fact that Adenauer received no advance information about this plan, so infuriated him that he delivered a public attack on American policy. Adenauer implied that the United States seemed to be backing away from its promise to defend Europe on the ground. He further stated:

...this new plan would mean shifting the principal emphasis to atomic weapons. This is a mistake, for to counter an East German invasion of West Germany with nuclear weapons would without doubt trigger an intercontinental rocket war...I am of the opinion that it is of special importance to localize small conflicts that may occur, and for this we need divisions with conventional weapons.¹⁵

To make matters worse, the introduction of nuclear weapons also added fuel to arguments concerning conventional forces. A 1957 study of German public opinion on military questions, conducted by Hans Speier, who at that time was the head of the Social Science Division of the RAND corporation, showed that those who opposed rearmament, for

any reason, argued that conventional forces had been made obsolete and that it was an unnecessary cost and burden to maintain them.¹⁶

Attention is then focused on the September 1957 general elections in the Federal Republic, where public opinion concerning Adenauer's security policies was to be tested. The CDU, under the leadership of Adenauer, as in the 1953 campaign, won an overwhelming victory. The CDU's public relations apparatus, along with the moral support of the Catholic Church, the financing by the business community, the backing of the Western powers, and the events in Hungary, all aided the CDU campaign. The only real campaign the SPD could muster was their opposition to atomic weapons, along with a variety of social demands and a vague foreign policy.¹⁷ There are several good reasons why the SPD failed to rally with the anti-nuclear sentiments and direct those feelings into a viable political platform. Adenauer basically discredited the anti-nuclear campaign by equating the goals of the SPD with those of the Soviet Union and East Germany. As Josef Joffe puts it, "the message was crude and effective: if nuclear abstinence was good for the Soviets, it had to be bad for the Germans."¹⁸ Thus public opinion, although it appeared to be against the policy towards nuclear weapons, demonstrated, as it did in 1953, its

confidence in the CDU's ability to keep the Federal Republic a secure and sovereign state.

The opposition to nuclear weapons, both within the Bundestag and from the "Fight Atomic Death" campaign, wilted by the summer of 1958. One reason concerned the failure of the Constitutional Court to allow anti-nuclear referenda in the SPD-ruled city-states of Hamburg and Bremen.¹⁹

Josef Joffe suggests three lessons that can be derived from the struggle over nuclear weapons "which define some crucial parameters of German defense policy."²⁰ First, public opinion clearly dictated the unpopularity of nuclear armaments. In a poll taken in 1958, 52 percent of the respondents favored a general strike to prevent such an occurrence.²¹ In March 1958, EMNID polls showed that 83 percent of the respondents were opposed to the construction of launching pads on West German soil. With such public opposition to an issue, it would have been a mistake to make public the debates within the government.

Second, the failure of the opposition to stop the placement of nuclear weapons upon West German soil points out that no matter how explosive such issues can become, the "capacity of one party, especially on the left, to convert these feelings into an unambiguous policy" has certain limitations.

Third, the decision to place nuclear weapons upon West German soil caused the sharpest deterioration of German-Soviet relations to date and was a factor in precipitating the Berlin Crisis of 1958-1962. Unlike today, however, where Ostpolitik could be at stake over such an issue, in 1958 the Soviets could only offer warnings that the weapons would heighten international tension.

2. The Opposition (1977-1982)

The ultimate success or failure of the movement against ER weapons or INF is inconclusive at this point, but the controversy over both issues offers an instructive case study in the continuity of the goals that were formulated in the 1950s and the changes concerning West German domestic politics and diplomacy.

The similarity to the first two phases concerns the public attitude towards rearmament. In the case of ER weapons, the Federal Republic was again placed in a precarious position where public opinion was overwhelmingly opposed to the idea of a "neutron bomb." On April 13, 1978, a Die Welt article stated that only 28 percent of those who knew about the weapon (approximately 75 percent of the total population) believed that it would enhance West European defense. A November 23, 1981 EMNID poll revealed that only 13 percent of the respondents would endorse the weapon without certain reservations.

Several variables that didn't exist in the 1950s, however, were set in motion during the ER weapons controversy.

1) In the 1950s, the SPD was in opposition and moving to the right. In the third phase, however, the SPD was in power and moving to the left.

2) Unlike the strong unity that existed with the governing CDU party in the 1950s, the governing SPD had deep internal political difficulties.

3) The opposition to security policy is a more broad-based group of politicians, pacifists, ecologists and "alternative culture" people.

4) Since the introduction of Ostpolitik, the West German government now has to deal with both deterrence and detente.

5) The public attitude in West Germany towards the United States is slipping, while at the same time there is less credit given to the Soviet threat.

Throughout the ER weapons issue, Helmut Schmidt's government was caught between trying to appease the voting public on one side and trying to keep together a strained German-American relationship on the other:

Given the line-up of forces at home and abroad, the government could not move very far in either direction. If it came out clamoring for the bomb, it would galvanize the opposition of the SPD and FDP left wing and antagonize the Soviet Union. If it rejected the American offer...it would draw the fire of the Opposition and alienate the Americans.²³

Thus the crucial point to be recognized here is not whether the West Germans accepted or declined the ER weapons, but who would get stuck with the blame for either outcome. In light of this reasoning, it is not surprising that Schmidt attempted to shift the burden of decision over to the Americans.

The political consequences of the ER weapons controversy emerged in the form of a dilemma between deterrence and detente, which is more sharply illustrated in the INF issue. Lothar Ruehl predicted in 1979 that:

...if ER weapons for tactical battlefield use were not to be introduced for "strategic and political" reasons, then sooner or later all other NATO nuclear weapons on the European continent would have to become subject to such objections and so the entire program of modernization of nuclear strike forces in Europe would become the object of political vetos.²⁴

The results of recent public opinion polls in the Federal Republic give Ruehl's prediction a sense of reality. An examination of these results not only reveals the extent of the new peace movement's political effectiveness towards opposing INF, but also brings to light some sociological aspects that effect the political structure within the Federal Republic.²⁵

With regard to the question of INF, EMNID reported that 36 percent of those West Germans who were surveyed are for the NATO dual track decision, while Allensbach reported that it found 53 percent in favor.²⁶ When confronted with a

choice of negotiating for arms limitations or restoring a military balance, 64 percent of the respondents chose negotiations versus 34 percent who chose the latter, revealing West German concerns over nuclear modernization. As to the outcome of the negotiations, most West Germans expect the superpowers to come to an agreement, but at different levels:

--36 percent expect the establishment of a zero basis.

--23 percent expect a solution in terms of mutual arms reduction and deployment of American medium-range missiles below the level presently announced.

--39 percent think a breakdown in negotiations will occur and will eventually lead to an arms race.

Concerning the influence of the new peace movement, 25 percent of the respondents considered the movement to have a direct effect upon the outcome of the disarmament talks; 25 percent thought that the movement could keep the West from closing the armaments gap; and 49 percent considered the movement to have no influence at all. When confronted with the question concerning their reaction to the peace movement, the West Germans responded in the following manner:

--10 percent rejected the peace movement.

--19 percent had misgivings about it.

--22 percent were indifferent to it or did not care about it.

--39 percent found the peace movement basically good, but did not wish to participate in it.

--7 percent said it may be possible for them to play an active role in the peace movement.

--1 percent would definitely play an active role.

--1 percent were already active in the peace movement.

The effects of the new peace movement, particularly the Greens/Alternative faction, on the German political structure are noteworthy. The opposition to rearmament in the 1960s never formed a united political front, which is one reason why it failed. The opposition to INF, however, is far more intense and is politically represented by the SPD left and the more radical Greens/Alternatives, who have new seats in 6 of the 11 Land parliaments (West Berlin, Bremen, Lower Saxony, Baden-Wurttemberg, Hamburg and Hesse). What this implies is a departure from the three decades of established political parties, presenting them with concern over the lost votes and, in the case of the Free Democrats, survival. If the current trends continue into the Federal elections scheduled for March 6, 1983, it could alter the political landscape in the Federal Republic decisively.²⁷

The October 1982 no-confidence vote, which ousted Schmidt and brought the CDU/CSU back into power, poses further implications for the issue over INF. The SPD is now wearing its traditional robes as an opposition party in debates over armament. It is possible, therefore, to see a shift of emphasis within the SPD from the center to the left. What this implies is a situation whereby the SPD left, under the leadership of Willy Brandt, Erhard Eppler and Egon Bahr would court the political clout of the Greens/Alternatives with the hope of gaining enough votes to hold the majority.

The scenario seems unlikely, at this point in time, given the unwillingness of the new parties to make political compromises or join into a coalition with the SPD. As the Greens Chairperson, Petra Kelly, states:

This system must be able to put up with an authentic grass-roots opposition outside the parliament along with the parliamentary opposition. I would like a strongly-based movement like ours to have a voice in parliament--but not just so we can join a coalition and acquire power.²⁸

In Hesse, for example, where the Greens presently hold the balance of power in the Land parliament, the Social Democrats are actively pursuing their support. In return, the Greens are demanding a "weapon-free zone--that all nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons be removed from Hesse--, a halt to the expansion of the Frankfurt airport and a replanting of the areas already cleared, an

end to nuclear energy in Hesse, and a ban on further autobahn construction."²⁹

The protest over the INF decision not only stimulates political controversy within the Federal Republic, but also brings to the surface a continuing undercurrent of social characteristics that have evolved since the postwar years:

The Brussels decision not only evoked one of the most intense domestic political controversies since the founding of the Federal Republic, but also illuminated far beyond the borders of our country the magnitude of the mortally dangerous risk of advancing nuclear armament and the scope of that risk, affecting each and every individual.³⁰

The social consequences that appear as a result of the peace movement's underlying fear of nuclear war, and an overall lack of confidence in the Federal Government's ability to prevent it, transcends the limits of neutralist and nationalist tendencies that were developed in the Federal Republic during the postwar years, as well as the 1950s.³¹ The original desires of the West Germans, which were discussed in Chapter One, are converging with those of the emerging new generation.

In attempting to understand the essence of the problem with the rise of nationalist and neutralist attitudes in West Germany, Pierre Hassner summarizes the general concept of a new national consciousness, what he calls the four variations of "Germanization":

1) The official conservative variant, expressed by Chancellor Schmidt, is anchored in the Western framework and in the reality of Germany's division into two states, but expresses a greater desire for an independent judgement on foreign policy and a national priority for maintaining (if need be against the wishes of the United States) the conquests of detente and Ostpolitik, in terms of security for West Berlin, of human contacts between the citizens of the two German states, and, possibly, of common interests between...the middle states of Central Europe.

2) The utopian variant, expressed by the Greens and the Alternatives, calls for the two Germanies to refuse their occupied status and their membership in the two alliances, in order to form at first, perhaps, a confederation but then certainly, a united neutral German state.

3) The strategic or manipulative variant [where] the policy starts from the official Ostpolitik aims to progress through little steps...towards a goal close to that of the utopian position. This view is expressed by the Brandt wing of the SPD: Egon Bahr, Gunter Gaus and Peter Bender [who] seize upon the peace and the nuclear issue to advance, via nuclear free zones and a "security partnership," the cause of the partnership between the two Germanies.

4) The psychological and moral variant [which] refers to the youth movement and to its evolution from state to society, from great international causes to local concerns and from there to a new feeling of cultural identity and, perhaps, to a new German and Central European consciousness.³²

This last variant is, perhaps, the most crucial, because the seemingly radical youth movement (or counter-society) has become a political force with both staying power and international significance. What emerges from this are sociological and political factors that link pacifism, neutralism and nationalism together with the rearmament protest of the 1950s and the anti-American protest of the 1960s.³³

The difference with this new generation from that of the 1950s is an altered international environment where German attitudes, in the wake of Ostpolitik, toward the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be changing. As Stephen Szabo concludes, "Postwar Germans are more distant from the American model and while they harbor few positive feelings toward either the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic, they also have a lower perception of military threat from the East than their parents or grandparents."³⁴ This fact is evident in recent public opinion polls (see Table 3.2) concerning the changing mood

TABLE 3.2

"Do you believe that the Russians today have the basic good will to reach an understanding with the West or not?"
(percentages)

Response	Apr/May 1959	Apr 1966	Jun 1971	Jan 1980	July 1981
Yes	17	26	35	16	36
No	57	54	51	70	48
Undecided	26	20	14	14	16

Source: Focus On, (German Information Center, No. 2
April 1982)

of the West Germans towards the Soviet Union. Concerning the notion of "Better red than dead" (see Table 3.3) the figures are even more startling.

TABLE 3.3

Attitudes Towards Defense or Capitulation to Soviets
(percentages)

Response	May 1955	July 1960	March 1976	March 1979	July 1981
To avoid nuclear war	36	38	52	52	45
Defend democracy	33	30	28	23	30
Undecided	31	32	20	25	25

Source: Focus On, (German Information Center, No. 2,
April 1982)

In the late 1950s, Edinger and Deutsch assessed the public mood of the West Germans with respect to the United States. They concluded that "a majority of German voters would like to combine American military protection and friendship with the advantages of neutralism."³⁵ This assessment is still valid today, and is once again evident in recent polls. Those respondents who chose neutrality over remaining in some kind of military alliance were asked to respond to the following question: "Since you are in favor of a neutral Germany, would you then welcome the departure of American troops from Germany?" The results indicated that:

--38 percent would regret the departure of American troops.

--37 percent said it would make no difference either way.

--24 percent said they would welcome the departure.³⁶

The support for an independent course from that of the United States is strongest among the postwar generation and, in particular, those young Germans who are well-educated and politically active. Given the increasing general economic security along with the insecurity over nuclear weapons and general distrust of the political leaders, both German and American, this new generation of

Germans may find itself caught in the vice of the "Toqueville effect" where the reversal of a favorite trend is much less easily accepted than the situation which this trend had begun.³⁷ What could possibly result from this confluence of factors might be a situation where "the long-term existence of our sociopolitical order would come into question."³⁸

B. SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

The Soviet Union's involvement in the West German peace movement has also been one of continuity and change. In order to fully understand the nature of this involvement, we must begin with a brief history of the relations between the Soviets and Western Europe, particularly the Federal Republic. At the end of World War II, the Soviets viewed Western Europe as "both a potential buffer-zone against the United States and as a hostage to ensure good behavior from the Americans."³⁹ At the same time, capitalist West European societies, especially West Germany, were perceived as a challenge to the territorial status quo of Eastern Europe and to Moscow's dominant position in that area.⁴⁰

This double approach to the Federal Republic--as a major challenge and a potential partner--probably reflected the fact that West Germany was recognized by the Soviet leaders not only as economically and technologically the most powerful state in Western Europe, but also as a country which, for a number of reasons, was highly susceptible to Soviet influence.⁴¹

The outcome of these perceptions was a Soviet policy directed primarily at containing West German influence in Eastern Europe and retaining and increasing some Soviet leverage in West German affairs. This was accomplished by the following means:

1) Threatening and, alternatively, conciliatory initiatives with regard to Berlin and other issues that relate to the future of Germany;

2) The exploitation of intra-Western differences and rivalries, both between West European states and between Western Europe and the United States; and

3) Concerted actions of indigenous Communist parties and other so-called "peace-loving forces."⁴²

Peace, as it always appears in the ideological programs of the Soviet Communist party (CPSU), is presented as the sum total of diplomacy that is conducted by the Soviet state. Ideologically, peace exists in a dialectic form, transforming from peaceful co-existence to its higher form, which is a permanent peace that can only succeed under classless conditions. In other words, peace for Soviets must be the continuation of revolution by other means. Permanent peace is to be obtained by Soviet dominance of the entire world.

In general, the Soviets are masters in the art of "active measures" that seek to discredit and weaken the

United States and other nations so as to affect other nations' policies. These "active measures" include:

- 1) written or spoken disinformation;
- 2) efforts to control media in foreign countries;
- 3) use of Communist parties and front organizations;
- 4) clandestine radio broadcasting;
- 5) blackmail, personal and economic; and
- 6) political influence operations.⁴³

Various approaches used by Moscow include control of the press in foreign countries, outright and partial forgery of documents, use of rumors, insinuation, altered facts and lies, exploitation of a nation's academic, political, economic and media figures as collaborators to influence policies of a nation.

According to U.S. government sources, these "active measures" are integrated with legitimate Soviet foreign policy, with the decision to use "active measures" being made at the Politburo level. The activities are designed and operated within the large and complex bureaucracy of the KGB and CPSU International Department. Soviet agents are then assigned the various tasks of implementing the "active measures". The agents are often official and quasi-official Soviet representatives, which include academics, students, and journalists, where official Soviet links are not always out in the open.

There are two reasons why the Soviets have become somewhat successful with these activities. First, the nature of the Soviet system, i.e. the highly centralized structure of the Soviet state and its complete control over all elements of the society, gives the Soviet leaders free use of party, government and private citizens in implementing these "active measures." Second, the open societies of the Western countries and the ease of access to their news media often give the Soviets an added advantage.

The Soviets are attempting to use their policy of "active measures" to gain control of the new peace movement. One method they use is the attempt to join the bandwagon by starting their own so-called new peace offensive. The Soviet "peace-offensive", however, is far from being new. The post-World War II period witnessed the Soviets attempting to use their peace offensive (circa 1949) for political aims:

The Russians have cried peace so often and nearly always for such sinister reasons that Western diplomats now automatically look for hidden traps--or worse--in Moscow's proposals.

As viewed from Washington in 1950, the Soviet peace offensive was designed to coldly exploit the popular fear and confusion that was provoked from debates on the new hydrogen bomb and other mass destructive weapons. It was perceived by Western sources that the Kremlin believed that

the peoples of the Western world might ultimately force their governments into a peace-at-any-price attitude.

The major political aim of the Soviet peace offensive, with respect to Germany, was to get the Western occupation armies out and use Red organizations, which had infiltrated non-Communist parties, to agitate for German unity in terms that would eventually see West Germany absorbed by the East.

A good case study of Soviet intervention into West German political affairs took place during the 1957 general election campaign. As noted earlier, in April of that year, the Bundestag was debating the issue of atomic weapons. Concurrent with those debates, the Soviets were playing a sort of carrot and stick game with the West German government. Along with various pronouncements referring to the "spirit of Rapallo", Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko handed the West German charge d'affaires in Moscow a threatening note, which stated:

If the nuclear weapons were used, the whole of Western Germany would become one single cemetery...for the Federal Republic this is in essence a matter of life and death.⁴⁵

In further attempts on the Soviets' part to embarrass the Adenauer campaign, Gromyko handed the German Ambassador in Moscow a Note which "re-emphasized the Russian view of reunification with a blunt appeal to the electorate."⁴⁶ The Note stated:

The Federal Republic is now faced with the choice: Either it renounces its NATO policy and its war preparations and establishes the unity of Germany gradually by peaceful means, or else it continues its present political course, pregnant with extreme danger for the population of Western Germany, and takes responsibility of the maintenance and accentuation of the division⁴⁷ of Germany. There is no third alternative.

Most of the intervention into the 1957 campaign came from East Germany, a method that remains active to this day. Several million propaganda brochures and pamphlets, produced in the German Democratic Republic, were randomly addressed to private individuals, to soldiers, young voters and visitors. Whole bundles of propaganda leaflets were discovered on couriers who visited the Federal Republic. The attempt on the part of the East Germans to propagandize the campaign was so extensive that one week prior to election day, some two hundred and twenty different types of material were intercepted by the West German security authorities.⁴⁸ Most of the common propaganda consisted of colored stickers with mottoes such as "Whoever votes for Adenauer, votes also for atomic war." But the great majority of the Communist material that was distributed in West Germany was of three different types. An imitation 10-mark note was printed and purposefully left on sidewalks. When passers-by picked up the note, and examined their new-found wealth, the back of the note revealed the following statement:

This note of course is not genuine. But have you ever thought about the fact that...of every 10-mark note the

government takes away 2.50DM?...Not a vote for the CDU/CSU, the party of tax blackmailers and rearmament hyenas. Vote SPD! - The Communist Party of Germany.⁴⁹

Some of the more ingenious kinds of propaganda schemes included:

1) A catalogue for a well-known make of small car which opened to an argument that the CDU, with its monopolists and militarists, steered Germany's course.

2) A leaflet made to look like a Post Office notice for instructions on how to use Savings Bank accounts which opened to reveal the manifesto of the 1957 KPD Congress.

3) Under the cover of All Quiet on the Western Front were found forty pages of a Communist version of the Hungarian revolt and eight pages of photographs of subjects such as the corpses of Hungarian victims of the "white counter revolution."

4) Covers depicting poses by actress Marilyn Monroe, used for speedy circulation, contained Communist propaganda.

5) Various newspapers such as the Neue Bild-Zeitung copied the layout and features of its Western counterpart, but presented straight Communist propaganda.

6) In an attempt to cause confusion among draftees, phony official-looking letters were sent to a large number of conscripts exempting them from service regardless of prior or future notification.

In its continuing effort to utilize their active measures against West German security policy, the Soviets intensified their peace offensive to counter the ER weapons issue and INF. Through their large propaganda apparatus, the Soviets were able to capitalize on the fear of limited nuclear war. They stated to the West Germans:

If there is war, that is, if we attack you, Americans will lay waste to your country and people. Since defense is impossible without annihilation, you should quit NATO, cease being pawns of the Americans and come to peaceful and profitable terms with use.⁵⁰

The delay by President Carter in reaching a final decision on the production of ER weapons afforded the Soviets the opportunity to initiate a world-wide campaign to prevent production of the weapons. Throughout July 1977, the Soviets, along with the faithful state-controlled media of Eastern Europe, used the press and radio to spread the following message:

The ghastly new American weapon, the neutron bomb, threatens mankind with nuclear extinction. To be for the neutron bomb is to be for war, To oppose the neutron bomb is to be for peace.⁵¹

In August 1977, the Soviet campaign moved into a more covert style. The World Peace Council, a well-known Soviet front organization, was instrumental in promoting public demonstrations in Bonn, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Istanbul from August 6-13. Although most of the demonstrators were motivated by spontaneous emotions of anti-Americanism, pacifism, and a longing for peace, it was apparent that the

organization and advertising was subtly directed by the Soviets.⁵²

The Soviets also left no stone unturned when it came to methods of pressuring President Carter. Playing upon Carter's much publicized Baptist ethics and morals, TASS reported:

Soviet Baptist leaders today condemned production of the neutron bomb as 'contrary to the teachings of Christ' and urged fellow Baptists in the United States to raise their voices in defense of peace.⁵³

The Soviets view the campaign as being completely successfully. The Hungarian chief of the Communist Party's International Department, Janos Berecz, stated, "The political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most significant and successful since World War II."⁵⁴

In response to NATO's December 1979 decision to introduce 572 Cruise and Pershing II missiles into Western Europe, the Soviets launched another extensive program of active measures, this time for the purpose of developing an environment of public opinion opposed to the NATO decision. Fortunately for the Soviets, large protest movements in Western Europe already existed.

In this campaign, the Soviets actively used political and economic pressure to try to persuade various European countries to oppose the INF modernization plan. In one host country, the Soviet Ambassador met privately with the Minister of Commerce to discuss the supply and price of oil

sold by the Soviet Union to that country. He suggested that if the host country would oppose INF, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs might persuade the Soviet Ministry of Trade to grant more favorable oil prices.⁵⁵

Another method of Soviet involvement that proved highly successful in the campaign against ER weapons has been either the creation of or backing of several front groups who oppose the INF decision. In general, these front groups have lobbied non-Communist participants, including anti-nuclear groups, pacifists and environmentalists. In some cases, the activities of these front groups have been directed by local Communist parties. Two examples of this type of Soviet involvement are revealed in the activities of the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) and the German Communist Party (DKP).

The CPN has organized its own front group known as the Dutch Christians for Socialism. In November 1980, another CPN-related group called the Dutch Joint Committee--Stop the Neutron Bomb--Stop the Nuclear Armament Race sponsored an international forum against nuclear arms in Amsterdam. This forum succeeded in attracting a variety of non-Communist groups with the intent to prevent final approval by the Dutch parliament on INF. In April 1981, the Dutch authorities expelled KGB officer Vadim Leonev, who associated closely with the leaders of the Dutch peace movement.⁵⁶ In

a drunken boast to a Dutch counterintelligence source, Leonev stated:

If Moscow decides that 50,000 demonstrators must take to the streets in the Netherlands, then they take to the streets. Do you know how you can get 50,000 demonstrators at a certain place within a week? A message through my channels is sufficient.⁵⁷

Another example of KGB involvement was the deportation of Stanislav Chebotek from Norway in November 1981. He was caught offering bribes to those Norwegians who "would write letters to newspapers denouncing NATO and the proposed missiles for Europe."⁵⁸

In the case of Germany, the Soviets have attempted to infiltrate the various factions of the peace movement. Towards the end of the 1970s, the Soviets increased their active measures aimed at influencing public opinion in West Germany. This led to the establishment of the Department for International Information, headed by Soviet German experts such as Leonid Zamyatin and Valentin Falin.⁵⁹ The Soviets hope to influence the West German peace movement by attempting to discredit the view that pacifists and communists can't form a coalition. They exert this influence through the Western Affairs Department of East Germany's SED to West Germany's counterpart organizations which are known as K-groups (see Appendix I). It is interesting to note that the total membership of the DKP is only approximately 40,000. During the 1980 general elections they only polled 0.2 percent of the total votes.

Along with these K-groups, the Soviets have direct influence upon the front groups that include the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the Women's International Democratic Federation. To complement those organizations that are known for their pro-Soviet bias, the Soviets have also indirectly sponsored various petitions and appeals calling for an end to nuclear arms in Western Europe. One such occasion known as the Krefeld Appeal, which collected almost 2 million signatures, was partially funded by the Soviets through the East German SED and the German Peace Union.⁶⁰ Since the West German peace movement is poorly funded from its own sources, it cautiously accepts money from the Communists.⁶¹

At present, the target of Soviet active measures in West Germany still remains directed at the growing popularity of the peace movement. The fundamental problem that exists between the Moscow-oriented Communists and the peace movement is the Communists' criticism of pacifist attitudes toward the use of weapons. According to the Communist argument, "it is impossible to believe in the possibility of preventing a war through conviction and persuasion alone," an attitude that "could harm the working class and hence the objectives of the USSR."⁶² The Soviets, therefore, direct their policy at using the anti-war attitude to promote its own interests:

West European societal forces are to be harnessed to the Soviet-controlled world movement. In the first phase, broad masses of the public are to be induced to join the struggle against war and thus act as a reliable barrier in the path of possible aggression.⁶³

Some of the non-Soviet-influenced factions within the peace movement are well aware of the Soviet Union's attempts to control the anti-nuclear movement. For example, Gerd Bastian, a retired Bundeswehr general and a chief advisor to the Greens party on military affairs, stated in an interview that the Greens party is actively seeking ways to isolate the Soviet involvement. In April 1982, however, the Greens admitted and complained that the Communists (probably referring to the K-groups) has already taken over the planning of the anti-Reagan demonstrations that were held in Bonn later in June.⁶⁴

The Soviets have been quicker than Washington to assess the changing mood of the West Germans. The late Leonid Brezhnev dispatched scores of Soviet officials to West Germany for the purpose of presenting Moscow's peace propaganda, which included some previous, but still luring statements made by Kosygin in 1957:

The Soviet Union will under no circumstances use nuclear weapons against states...that do not have such weapons on their soil.⁶⁵

The Soviet peace offensive has been a continuing attempt at discrediting U.S. commitment to Western Europe as well as isolating NATO from the European mainstream. Although some

of the short-range objectives of the peace offensive have changed, the long-range objective of Soviet hegemony throughout all of Europe and ultimately the entire world still remains.

Many Europeans are no longer eying the Soviet peace offensive in terms of trickery and deceit. On the contrary, a very favorable position of detente between the Soviets and the West Germans was born out of the offensive. In 1978 and 1979, Soviet diplomacy worked to negotiate a series of bilateral long-term economic and political agreements with all the major countries in Western Europe, except for Great Britain. For its part, the Soviets are carrying out their desire to project the illusion of a constant move towards peace.

The Soviet Union's entire peace policy could be described in terms of a shifting of political and diplomatic forums, from one place to another: using any means...to wear down the fundamental East-West dichotomies...to replace them with a web of substitute agreements...like Helsinki or the Nordic non-nuclear idea.

One of the more remarkable aspects of this diplomatic behavior is that it has resulted not in condemnation of Soviet attitudes, but that it has had precisely the opposite effect.^{oo}

The majority of the European peace movement may never understand the nature of the Soviet involvement. The activities that were discussed will probably continue to go unnoticed, as well as the reality of the Soviet's ultimate goal, which is undoubtedly not peace as we know it.

Once again, it is still too early to make any assessments on the success or failure of the anti-INF campaign, especially with regard to the Soviet involvement. One fact, however, remains quite clear. The mixture of Communists, Trotskyites and militant anarchists, who wish to manipulate the peace movement so as to bring about the rapid downfall of the Western Alliance, all provide an excellent opportunity for the Soviets to enjoy the rewards of three decades of intervention on the West European continent.

IV. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The central focus of this thesis has been directed towards a comparison of three phases of opposition to security policy with the Federal Republic of Germany in an attempt to establish whether the most recent phase of opposition (1977-1982) possesses the most potential for influencing West German decision-making.

In summary, the first phase (1950-1955) witnessed the beginning of postwar protest over rearmament, where the SPD strenuously opposed the policy:

It was a time when successive reunification offers on the part of the Soviet Union fell on semireceptive ears in a Social Democratic Party...¹

The Social Democrats opposed rearmament, not merely out of a certain traditional internationalism, but due to their concern for the unity and integrity of the entire German nation. Ollenhauer never intended to lead the Federal Republic towards neutralism. The possibility for reunification, however, was his first and foremost priority. He stated, "We are thinking about new negotiations...about the creation of a collective security system which will preserve world peace through the equal participation of all nations."²

For its part, the CDU under the leadership of Adenauer adopted the policy of rearmament, not merely out of anti-communist sentiments, but due to a desire for European economic and political integration which superseded the national concept.³ Adenauer was concerned with safeguarding freedom, the most essential value, where "territorial integrity, freedom of action in foreign policy, and freedom of domestic self-determination were necessary conditions for the existence of the country and its people, and, therefore, an absolute priority, which had to be defended accordingly."⁴ The consequence was the loss of an opportunity for early reunification. The divergence in political priorities, defense versus detente and disarmament, which took shape during the rearmament debates, created a lasting dilemma in the formulation of security policy within the Federal Republic. On a positive note, however, the economic resurgence of West Germany, coupled with the recognition of the Federal Republic's sovereignty by the Western powers, brought a recovery of German prestige, and with it the failure of the opposition's attempt to foil the plans for rearmament.

The second phase of opposition (1957-1958) witnessed the beginning of other problems that currently plague domestic politics, as well as defense policy within West Germany. The shift of U.S. policy in 1956 towards the replacement of

ground troops with nuclear weapons gave rise to the "decoupling" trauma which haunts Europe's NATO allies to this day. Once again West German policy was caught in a painful domestic and strategic squeeze. Unlike the options of peace in freedom or reunification that clearly characterized the first phase of opposition, this phase was characterized by the alarm of many West German citizens over the possibilities of "atomic death." The appeal by 18 West German scientists certainly provided the stimulus for the debate in the Bundestag, between the Adenauer government and the SPD opposition.

The "Fight Atomic Death" movement rapidly developed with the support of the Social Democrats and the German Trade Union Federation, along with many scientists, artists, and intellectuals. Although the movement carried out numerous rallies and demonstrations, it failed to prevent the nuclear weapons from being placed on West German soil. The movement lost momentum and most of its political clout due to the following reasons:

- 1) The July 1958 Federal Constitutional Court ruling against a referendum on nuclear armament;

- 2) The CDU gained an absolute majority in the Land elections of North-Rhine Westphalia, a traditional stronghold of the SPD;

3) The Soviet Union's "Berlin Ultimatum" of November 1958; and

4) The withdrawal from the movement by the SPD and Trade Union Federation, after the SPD was out-voted by left-wing forces at the Berlin Student Congress against atomic weapons in January 1959.⁵

The third phase of opposition (1977-1982) demonstrates that there has been a continuity of the peace movement, but "a continuity diminished by the fact that various tendencies have had to regroup from time to time around new themes."⁶ This new peace movement can be distinguished from the prior two phases of opposition by its broader-based organization and international appeal. The new peace movement also demonstrates a dynamic force that was not present in the earlier campaigns. This dynamism is a set of complex politico-sociological factors that encompass the attitudes of the postwar, postmaterialist generation of West Germans. This feature of the new peace movement deserves our fullest attention, for one has only to recall the effects that other past radical German thinkers have had on society, such as Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Feuerbach, Hegel and Nietzsche. Other alternatives to INF, which include varieties of conventional defenses, and pacifist notions of unilateral withdrawals, can all be dealt with on a rational basis. But a new danger is mounting in West Germany. Gerhard

Wettig of the Federal Institute for Eastern and

International Studies writes:

The most disquieting element [of the new movement] lies in the fact that the peace movement's following now increasingly includes groupings that are generally closed to political considerations and thought categories. These groups view peace and armament issues purely in the light of personal psychotherapeutic criteria...Moreover, they regard themselves as a morally superior counter-culture in relation to the established politicians and political go-getters.⁷

With respect to security policy, this "alternative-culture" seeks to overcome (what they term) the senseless strategy of maintaining peace through the possession of global destruction capabilities. The Alternatives, however, have not offered any feasible answers. Wettig points out that "it would be very dangerous indeed if an unrealistic idealism in matters of security policy were to combine... with the fermentation agent of environmental protection" to replace a rational solution "to the peace and armament problem. If this were the case, the Federal Republic of Germany could slip into the Soviet sphere of influence..."⁸

It is too early to measure the effect of the opposition to INF, in terms of success or failure to change the current policy. We have, however, examined the political base of the peace movement which provides us with some insight into the prospects for the future of the Federal Republic. Given the desires of the pacifists and SPD left, should the peace movement be successful in stopping the Cruise and

Pershing II missiles from arriving, the Federal Republic could be more inclined to favor an anti-American, Socialist, and neutralist policy.

A recent book entitled The End of the Ideological Age by Peter Bender, hypothesizes that a neutral Europe is both possible and desirable. The Western alliance system, then, is to be continued solely because it provides the structure under which this peaceful transformation can take place.⁹ The lack of credibility in Bender's neutral option is readily seen in the following passage from his book:

...if it [Europe] would no longer house either missiles or radio facilities that can reach into Soviet territory...if neither human rights nor Polish or Czech models were used as political weapons, then there would be a prospect that the Kremlin would permit democracy to come right up to the frontiers of the Soviet empire.¹⁰

With the current shift of the SPD to the left, this nationalist, neutralist position comes more clearly into focus. The fate of the SPD, particularly the SPD left, therefore, holds profound implications for the future security policies of the Federal Republic.

The question then arises as to what can be done, by both the United States and the pro-NATO elements within the Federal Republic, to stop these developments from occurring. With respect to the "alternative-culture", the German government cannot ignore the "groundswells" of discontent and press on regardless. They should begin their efforts by

talking to their young people, though the dialogue may prove difficult, if not impossible.¹¹ Hans Rühle offers a good summary of solutions to these problems as they relate to the NATO alliance:

1) Facilities for mutual learning must be created in which friendships and understanding for the other side's interests can grow.

2) The partners in transatlantic dialogue must be truthful not only to their opponents but also to each other.

3) The NATO states must unify the goals and perspectives of social policy.

4) The threat [Soviet] must be made visible again...not where it no longer exists nor need it be exaggerated.

5) The alliance must be shown that (when compared to economic demands) security has a natural priority in the list of national responsibilities...the maintenance of life and freedom of its citizens.

6) Security is no longer available dirt-cheap. The Atlantic Alliance will only survive if all the partners help bear each others' burdens.¹²

In the final analysis, the new peace movement in West Germany and the pressures that it can bring to bear upon the security policy of the Federal Republic are not to be taken lightly. With an already declining German-American relationship, the future of West German security becomes

even more uncertain. The German debate over INF has by no means reached its zenith, and given the increasing economic difficulties, the introduction of the weapons could spell only the beginning of West Germany's domestic turmoil.

Although stresses are inevitable in any alliance, it is important for Americans to realize that West German attitudes are changing. The post-war generation no longer feels responsible for the Hitler era and, unlike their fathers and uncles, they do not feel special obligations to the United States. Politically aware young Germans appear to be proud of the Federal Republic's achievements since World War II, but at the same time are painfully aware of their vulnerability should war ever break out.

The best policy for the security of the Federal Republic is to remain a staunch ally with the United States. But American misperceptions of German attitudes, coupled with inconsistencies in U.S. foreign policy, have raised basic doubts in West Germany about America's willingness to defend Western Europe. If these doubts continue to grow, the recommendations of the peace movement (e.g., a nuclear-freeze or unilateral disarmament) may receive more attention and, if implemented, could lead to the eventual disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance.

APPENDIX I

STRUCTURE OF THE WEST GERMAN PEACE GROUPS*

Pacifists	Orthodox Communist	Dogmatic New Left	Undogmatic New Left	Ecologists
EKD	DKP	KBW	Students	Greens
Pax Christi	SDAJ	BWK	Women Gps.	
	MSB	KB	Alt. List	
	JP	KPD	Marxists	
	VVN-BDA		TAZ	
	DFU		Socialist	
	VDJ		Bureau	
	DFGIVK			
	DFI			
	UFAZ			

EKD- Evangelical Church of Germany

DKP- German Communist Party (40,000 members)

SDAJ- Socialist German Workers' Youth (15,000 members)

MSB- Marxist Student League (6,000 members)

JP- Young Pioneers (2,000 members)

VVN-BDA- League of Anti-Fascists (10,000 members)

DFU- German Peace Union (3,000 members)

VDJ- Association of Democratic Jews (?)

DFGIVK- German Peace Society/United War Resisters (14,500 members)

DFI- Democratic Women's Initiative (?)

UFAZ- Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation

KBW- Communist League of West Germany (1400 members)

BWK- League of West German Communists (600 members)

KB- Communist League (800 members)

-K-Groups

KPD- Communist Party of Germany (500 members)

TAZ- Tageszeitung (Daily Newspaper)

*Information obtained from an interview with Dr. Friedhelm Meyer zu Natrup of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, June 21, 1982.

APPENDIX II

THE HEIDELBERG THESES 1959

Thesis 1

World Peace has become a condition for living in the technological age.

Thesis 2

The Christian must require himself to make a special contribution to the establishment of peace.

Thesis 3

War must be abolished by persistent and progressive effort.

Thesis 4

Active participation in this work for peace is our most simple and most obvious duty.

Thesis 5

The way to world peace runs through an area in which the justice and freedom are endangered because the traditional justification for war is no longer valid.

Thesis 6

We must try to understand the different conscientious decisions taken about nuclear arms in this dilemma as complementary actions.

Thesis 7

The Church must recognize the renunciation of arms as a Christian way of acting.

Thesis 8

The Church must recognize participation in the attempt to safeguard peace in freedom by the presence of nuclear weapons as still being a possible Christian way of acting today.

Thesis 9

For a soldier in an Army equipped with nuclear weapons it is true that: if you say 'A' you must expect to have to say 'B'; but woe to the irresponsible!

Thesis 10

If the Church speaks at all on world politics, it should make clear the necessity of a peaceful order to the states with nuclear weapons and advise those without nuclear weapons not to try to acquire them.

Thesis 11

Not everyone must do the same thing, but everyone must know what he/she is doing.

APPENDIX III

LIST OF PROMINENT SIGNERS TO THE GERMAN PEACE APPEAL

Heinrich Albertz, pastor and former mayor of Berlin
Gerd Bastian, retired majorgeneral of the Bundeswehr
Rudolf Bindig, Member of Parliament
Heinrich Böll, author and Nobel-Prize winner
Volkmar Deile, clergyman and exec. director "Aktion
Sühnezeichen/Freidensdienste"
Erhard Eppler, former minister of development of FRG
Anton A. Fischer, member of the exec. committee of the FDP
Martin Hirsch, judge of supreme court
Petra Kelly, chairperson "Die Grünen"
Prof. Jurgen Kunze, member state legislature and chairperson
of FDP Berlin
Konrad Kunick, chairman of SPD Bremen
Dr. Alfred Mechttersheimer, peace researcher
D. Martin Niemöller DD., pastor

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1. "Niemöller's Nationalist Statements Stir a Critical Barrage in Germany," New York Times, 2 January 1950, sec. 1, p. 4.
2. Ibid.
3. Nevil Johnson, Government in the Federal Republic of Germany, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1973), pp. 24-39.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 39.
7. Ibid.
8. Peter H. Merkl, GERMANY: Yesterday and Tomorrow, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 126-147.
9. Ibid., p. 206.
10. Ibid., p. 209.
11. Ibid., p. 211.
12. Ibid.
13. Anonymous author cited in Peter H. Merkl, GERMANY: Yesterday and Tomorrow, p. 215.
14. Ibid., p. 217.
15. Ibid., p. 221.
16. Margaret Caryle, ed., Documents on International Affairs 1949-1950, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 157-159.
17. Peter N. Merkl, The Origins of the West German Republic, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 53.

18. This is an extract from Adenauer's inaugural speech as President of the Parliamentary Council (September 1, 1948), cited in Munro Gordon Douglas' Two Germanies: A Lasting Solution to the German Question?, (Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1972), p. 150.
19. Stanley Hoffman, Conditions of World Order, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), pp. 110-163.
20. Munro Gordon Douglas, Two Germanies: A Lasting Solution to the German Question?, p. 153.
21. A more detailed description of this political thinking can be found in Richard Hiscock's The Adenauer Era, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott Company, 1966).
22. Munro Gordon Douglas, Two Germanies: A Lasting Solution to the German Question?, p. 155.
23. Ibid.
24. Peter H. Merkl, GERMANY: Yesterday and Tomorrow, p. 240.
25. Richard Hiscocks, The Adenauer Era, p. 208
26. The Times, 23 December 1949, p. 4a.
27. Richard Hiscocks, The Adenauer Era, p. 209.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 210.

CHAPTER TWO

1. The Protocol, in part, stipulated that there would be no West German military forces.
2. Roger Morgan, West European Politics Since 1945 (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1972) p. 110.
3. "Joint Declaration on Germany," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXIII (May 22, 1950) pp. 787-788.
4. Morgan, p. 110.
5. Konrad Adenauer, Adenauer's Memoirs 1945-1953 (Chicago: Henry Regner Company, 1965) p. 271.
6. William L. Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of World History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972) p. 1195.
7. Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1949-1950, (New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953) p. 241.
8. Documents on Germany 1941-1961, (Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961) pp. 99-100.
9. Soviet Monitor, October 20, 1950, cited in J.H. Wolfe, German Reunification: Illusion or Future Reality? (a doctoral dissertation from the University of Maryland, 1962) p. 83.
10. Morgan, p. 111.
11. Lewis J. Edinger, Kurt Schumacher, A Study in Personality and Political Behavior (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965) p. 188.
12. Die Zeit, May 18, 1950, cited in W.H. Hanreider, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1979 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980) p. 97.
13. Edinger, p. 188.
14. Ibid., p. 231.

15. Ibid.
16. "The Preservation, Promotion and Renewal of Peace," EKD Bulletin, October 1981, p. 21.
17. Ibid., p. 22.
18. London Times, November 18, 1950.
19. Ibid.
20. London Times, November 20, 1950.
21. London Times, November 30, 1950.
22. Ibid.
23. Documents on Germany, p. 116.
24. Morgan, p. 112.
25. London Times, April 17, 1952.
26. Ibid.
27. London Times, September 29, 1952.
28. Adenauer's Memoirs, p. 431.
29. Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, ed., West German Leadership and Foreign Policy (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957) p. 169.
30. Ibid., p. 170.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., pp. 172-174.
33. Cited in The New Republic, October 26, 1954.
34. America, October 3, 1981, pp. 174-178.
35. U.S. News and World Report, May 3, 1957, pp. 106-108.
36. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1957, pp. 283-286.
37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.; von Weizsäcker is a reputed German physicist and a co-signer of the April 12 declaration.
39. Documents on Germany, p. 240.
40. The Reporter, August 8, 1957, p. 48.
41. Franz-Josef Strauss, "Sicherheit und Wiedervereinigung," Aussenpolitik (March 6, 1957) pp. 140-147, cited in Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959) p. 221.
42. U.W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960) p. 89.
43. Ibid.
44. America, October 3, 1981, p. 175.
45. An article in the Economist, March 29, 1958, gave a good example of those verbal abuses. "While Kiesinger was commending the statesmanlike qualities of his vulnerable chief, the house rang with mocking cries of 'Heil! Heil! Heil!' and when the young Hamburg socialist, Herr Helmut Schmidt, reminded a Christian Democrat that he had voted for the enabling bill with which Hitler finally extinguished parliamentary government 25 years ago, Schmidt was interrupted by one deputy calling him the rudest lout in the house, and by another (a woman) likening him to a shot of poison."
46. London Times, March 26, 1958.
47. Economist, March 29, 1958; The government case depended on the fact that it only agreed to buy weapons of a nuclear capacity, while the warheads remained in U.S. possession.
48. London Times, March 25, 1958.
49. Ibid.
50. London Times, March 29, 1958.
51. London Times, April 10, 1958.
52. London Times, April 25, 1958.

53. London Times, August 17, 1958.
54. Josef Joffe, "German Defense Policy: Novel Solutions and Enduring Dilemmas," in Gregory Flynn, ed., The Internal Fabric of Western Society (London: Croom Helm, 1981) p. 83.
55. Gerry O'Connell, "West Germany's Peace Movement: A Troubled Tradition," America, 3 October 1981, p. 176.
56. See Dennis L. Bark's "Impressions of Student Life in Germany Today," Central Europe Journal, Vol. 20, 7/8, July/August 1972, for a more detailed account of those years.
57. Samuel T. Cohen offers an excellent essay on the nature of ER weapons from both a military and political perspective entitled, "The Neutron Bomb: The Potential Contribution of Enhanced Radiation Weapons," NATO's Strategic Options: Arms Control and Defense, edited by David S. Yost (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981) pp. 147-169.
58. See Walter Pincus, "Neutron Killer Warhead Buried in ERDA Budget," Washington Post, 4 June 1977.
59. Helmut Schmidt, Defense or Retaliation, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962) p. 65.
60. White Paper 1975/1976: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces, (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1976) p. 38.
61. New York Times, 23 July 1977.
62. Cited in Thomas C. Glad Theater Nuclear Force Modernization as an Issue in West German Politics, (Master's Thesis from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, December 1980) p. 66.
63. Ibid., pp. 67-68.
64. "Egon Bahr Outlines Thinking on Neutron Bomb Question," Flensburger Tageblatt, 4 February 1978, in FBIS Western Europe, 24 February 1978, p. 33.
65. Vorwärts, 27 October 1977, cited by Joseph Joffe "German Defense Policy: Novel Solutions and Enduring Dilemmas," in Gregory Flynn, ed., The Internal Fabric of Western Security, (London: Croom Helm, 1981) p. 87.

66. Ibid.
67. Cited by David S. Yost and Thomas C. Glad, "West German Party Politics and Theater Nuclear Modernization Since 1977," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 8, No. 4, Summer 1982, p. 532.
68. Hans Günter Brauch, "Zehn Gründe Gegen die Neutronenwaffe" (Ten Arguments Against the Neutron Weapon), Frankfurter Hefte: Zeitschrift Fur Kultur und Politik, XXIII, 15 February 1978, p. 3.
69. Löthar Rühl, "Die Nichtentscheidung Über die 'Neutronenwaffe': Ein Beispiel Verfehlter Bundespolitik," (The Non-Decision on the Neutron Bomb: An Example of Misguided Policy in the Alliance), Europa-Archiv, Folge 5, 10 March 1979, p. 147.
70. Ibid., pp. 148-149.
71. What ensued was a bit of embarrassing diplomacy between the United States and West Germany. Löthar Rühl offers a good account of the activities in the "Non-Decision of the Neutron Bomb," pp. 149-152.
72. New York Times, 22 May 1978, cited by Yost and Glad, p. 535.
73. German Tribune, 23 July 1978.
74. Ibid.
75. A declaration by Helmut Schmidt, cited in Hans Ruhle, "The Theater Nuclear Issue in German Politics," Strategic Review, Spring 1981, p. 58.
76. Yost and Glad, pp. 535-536.
77. Cited in Thomas Glad's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization, p. 82.
78. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "The Defense Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany," The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, edited by Douglas J. Murray and Paul P. Viotti (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) p. 280.
79. Yost and Glad, p. 538.

80. Suddeutsche Zeitung, 14 August 1979, cited in Josef Joffe, "German Defense Policy," p. 88.
81. Cited in "Aspects of Peace Policy," Press-und Information-samt der Bundesregierung, Bonn, May 1981, p. 12.
82. See Appendix I for a more complete list of groups.
83. "The Preservation, Promotion and Renewal of Peace: A Memorandum of the Evangelical Church in Germany," EKD Bulletin 1981, p. 23. Also see Appendix II.
84. Ibid., p. 42.
85. Ibid., p. 60.
86. Ibid., p. 4.
87. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
88. Platform for Pax Christi, cited in the German Tribune, 14 May 1982.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Manfred Wörner, "The Peace Movement and NATO: An Alternative View from Bonn," Strategic Review, Winter 1982, p. 17.
93. "West Germany's Peace Movement: A Troubled Tradition," America, 3 October 1982.
94. Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt replies to questions at the Protestant Church Congress, Hamburg, 18 June 1981, p. 36.
95. Focus On, German Information Center No. 6, July 1982.
96. Ibid.
97. Presented at an international press conference at the International Press Center Nieuwspoot, Hofsingel 12, the Hague, 25 November 1981.
98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 January 1981, cited in Josef Joffe, "German Defense Policy," p. 88.
102. Ibid.
103. Mut Für Eine Bessere Zukunft (Courage for a Better Future), an appeal presented by Social Democrats to the SPD National Executive, the SPD Bundestag Fraktion, and the Social Democratic Chancellor at a Bielefeld Congress, 9 December 1980.
104. Time, 30 November 1981.
105. Washington Post, 11 June 1982.
106. New York Times, 6 June 1982.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid. See Appendix III for a list of some prominent signers.
109. Time, 30 November 1981.
110. Ibid.
111. William E. Griffith, "Bonn and Washington: From Deterioration to Crisis?", Orbis, Spring 1982, p. 122.
112. Richard Löwenthal, "Why German Stability is so Insecure," Encounter, December 1978.
113. William E. Griffith, "Bonn and Washington," p. 118.
114. Interview with Dr. Friedhelm Meyer Zu Natrup of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 23 June 1982.
115. Chapter prepared for Stephen F. Szabo, ed., The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans, (London: Butterworth, 1982) pp. 23-24.
116. New York Times, 29 September 1982.

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1. Pierre Hassner, "Arms Control and the Politics of Pacifism in Protestant Europe," unpublished work, p. 3.
2. Lewis J. Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 229.
3. See O.M.G.U.S., "German Views on the Remilitarization Issue," Opinion Survey Reports, series 2, No. 58, (January 1, 1951).
4. Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, ed., West German Leadership and Foreign Policy, (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957) pp. 286-289.
5. Ibid., EMNID stated that neutrality meant one that was guaranteed by both sides. When asked to chose a neutrality controlled by one side or the other, the respondents chose the West, because they said that "Russia can't be trusted."
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9. Statement by German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss, cited in the Christian Science Monitor, December 18, 1958.
10. Deutsch and Edinger, p. 31.
11. Ibid., p. 165.
12. Gebhard Ludwig Schweigler, National Consciousness in Divided Germany, (London: Sage Publications, 1975) pp. 245-246.
13. Ibid.

14. Gordon A. Craig, "Atomic Weapons and the German Elections," The Reporter (August 8, 1957) p. 48.
15. Ibid.
16. Hans Speier, German Rearmament and Atomic War: The Views of German Military and Political Leaders, (Row, Peterson, 1957), p. 97.
17. U.W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960) p. 301.
18. Josef Joffe, "German Defense Policy: Novel Solutions and Enduring Dilemmas," (see footnote 1, p. 130, for rest of content) p. 83.
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21. Cited in a 1965 Allensbach poll entitled "Verlag für Demoskopie."
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24. Lothar Rühl, "The Non-Decision of the 'Neutron Bomb': An Example of Misguided Policy in the Alliance," Europa-Archiv, Folge 5, March 10, 1979.
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26. The difference in the percentages can probably be attributed to the different wording of the question.
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28. Ibid., p. 5.
29. The Week in Germany (German Information Center publication, Vol XIII, No. 39), November 5, 1982.

30. Günther Schmidt, "On the Sociology of the Peace Movement and Youth Protest," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (supplement to the weekly Das Parlament), B 24/82, June 19, 1982, p. 1.
31. See Stephen F. Szabo, The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans, (London: Butterworth, 1982), Chapter Two, for a more detailed analysis of the postwar generation.
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33. Ibid., p. 7.
34. Ibid.
35. Deutsch and Edinger, p. 22.
36. Focus On, No. 2, April 1982, p. 4.
37. Hassner, "Politics of Pacifism," pp. 14-15.
38. Gerhard Wettig, "The New Peace Movement in Germany," Aussenpolitik, July 1982, p. 232.
39. Karl E. Birnbaum, East and West Germany: a modus vivendi, (Saxon House/Lexington Books, 1973) p. 2.
40. Ibid.
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44. Newsweek, March 21, 1950, p. 28.
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46. Ibid., p. 254.
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54. Ibid., p. 229.
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57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p. 233.
59. Wettig, p. 229.
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61. Interview with Gert Bastian, June 29, 1982.
62. Wettig, pp. 229-230.
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65. Economist, November 1981, p. 48.
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
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